In hopes of attaining socialism through parliamentary and non-revolutionary strategies, social democratic parties initially inspired by a Marxian socialist view of development and class struggle gradually distanced themselves from socialism and embraced liberal and even neo-liberal perspectives. For the proponents of a revolutionary rapturous strategy, the cause of this huge divergence was simply the takeover of socialist movements by “opportunists” and “renegades”. But the reasons were far more complicated, having to do with the continued expansion of capitalism and its global dominance, the unceasing weakness of the working class, the rise of new middle classes, and the inability of reformist agents to adopt the right policies in their confrontations with capital. Reviewing reformist theories and important cases of socialist reformist movements, this article discusses the diverse obstacles that social democratic parties faced, and their reactive policies to changing circumstances. It argues that while in the long process of the transition from capitalism, radical socialist reformism and not a revolutionary rapturous strategy was the only possible option for the socialists, in face of enormous objective and subjective obstacles. The reactive and defeatist policies of the socialist agents failed to attract the support of the working class, the rising middle class, and identitarian groups, and to find the proper strategy for advancing towards a post-capitalist society.

Reformist Strategy

From the inception of Marxian socialist movements, reformism (as opposed to revolution) had its protagonists, seeking a parliamentary, peaceful and gradualist strategy for achieving socialism. Here I refer to Ralph Miliband’s distinction between “social reform” and “reformist strategy,” the former seeking to improve and maintain capitalist system, and the latter looking for gradual transformation and transition from capitalism to socialism. 

While Marx’s view of revolution and his initial excitements about the 1848 revolutions and the 1871 Paris Commune are well known, he also considered the possibility of a parliamentary path to socialism under certain conditions. As early as the 1850s, in his reports on Britain written for the New York Daily Tribune, Marx praised Chartists for their six demands relating to universal suffrage, noting that “the carrying of universal suffrage in England would be a far more socialistic measure than anything which has been honoured with that name on the Continent.” 

In his La Liberté speech after the Hague Congress of the First International (1872), he famously said  “...we do not deny that there are countries – such as America, England ... perhaps ... Holland ... where the workers can attain their goal by peaceful means.” In 1878, in an outline of a draft commentary on the Parliamentary debate on the Anti-Socialist Law, Marx wrote, “[i]f in England, for instance, or the United States, the working class were to gain a majority in the Parliament or Congress, they could by lawful means, rid themselves of such laws and institutions as impeded their development, though they could only do insofar as society had reached a sufficiently mature development.” 

In 1880, in a letter to Henry Hyndman, the founder of the first Socialist Party of England, Marx stated, “... an English revolution [is] not necessary, but according to historic precedents –[it is] possible. If the unavoidable evolution turn[s] into a revolution, it would not only be the fault of the ruling classes, but also of the working class.” He added, “… English working class know not how to wield their power and use their liberties, both of which they possess legally.” 

Another interesting example relates to Marx’s reaction in 1880 to the Marxist leaders of the Parti Ouvrier of France. In the preamble of the program that Marx had dictated, we read that the goals “... must be pursued by all means that [the] proletariat has at its disposal including universal suffrage which will thus be transformed from the instrument of deception that it has been until now into an instrument of emancipation.” 

Even in relation to the Paris Commune, in contrast to his earlier views, in a letter to a Dutch socialist leader in 1881, he considered the Commune to be “… merely an uprising of one city in exceptional circumstances, the majority of the Commune was in no sense socialist, nor could it have been. With a modicum of common sense, it could, however, have obtained the utmost that was then obtainable -- a compromise with Versailles beneficial to the people as a whole…” Earlier he had considered the Commune to be “essentially a government of the working class,” constituted as the result of “universal suffrage”. No doubt, as Pierre Birnbaum notes, there are ambiguities in Marx’s position on universal suffrage; whether it applied to all, just the proletariat, or “the healthy elements” of the society. But what is most certain, as mentioned above, traces of the reformist path can clearly be seen in Marx himself.

The reformist strategy can also be traced in Engels’s writings, most notably in his rather ambiguous and controversial 1895 introduction to Marx’s Class Struggle in France.  Aside from those who question the authenticity of the piece, there are two extreme viewpoints: those who believe that Engels completely parted with his earlier views and espoused ‘revisionism’ (Lucio Colletti and Terrell Carver), and those who contend there is no indication of break from Engels’s revolutionary past (Hal Draper, Paul Kellogg). 

The full and unabridged version (i.e., neither Liebknecht's summarized version in Vorwarts, nor Kautsky's more detailed version in Die Neue Zeit) shows that Engels, while holding to his earlier fundamental beliefs, has some significant reconsiderations. He refers to the “illusions” that he and Marx had about the 1848 revolutions, adding that “[h]istory has proved us wrong …. [and] has made clear that the status of economic development on the Continent was then by no means ripe for the abolition of capitalist production.” Questioning the “revolution of minority”, he states that “[t]he fighting methods of 1848 are today obsolete in every respect.” Referring to the subsequent rapid capitalist expansion, economic development, growth of industry and the working class in Europe, notably in Germany, Engels adds that “The German workers … furnished their comrades in all countries with a new and one of the sharpest weapons, by showing them how to utilize the general franchise.” He refers to the Communist Manifesto that “had already proclaimed the struggle for the general franchise, for democracy, as one of the first and most important tasks of the militant proletariat.” Stressing that “it is being realized that the old tactics must be revised,” Engels refers to the preamble of the program of the French Labour Party (dictated by Marx and mentioned above). We further read that “[w]ith this successful utilization of the general franchise, an entirely new method of the proletarian struggle had come into being…” Engels ends by saying that “[t]he irony of history turns everything upside down. We, the ‘revolutionists,’ the ‘upsetters,’ we thrive much better with legal than with illegal means in forcing an overthrow.”

Aside from some of Marx’s own views and those of Engels, the push for socialist reformism originates from Eduard Bernstein. In his book Problems of Socialism (published in English as Evolutionary Socialism), Bernstein departed from earlier views on the transition to socialism, questioning among others, the imminent collapse of capitalism. He stressed that the Communist Manifesto was correct about “the general tendencies” of social evolution, “but was mistaken in several special deductions, above all in the estimate of the time the evolution would take.” He added, “...it is evident that if social evolution takes a much greater period of time than was assumed, it must also take upon its forms and lead to forms that were not foreseen and could not be foreseen then.” Bernstein further argued that “[s]ocial conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition of classes as is depicted in the Manifesto” and added that the numbers of possessing class has become larger, and the conditions of work, trade unions and cooperatives had changed. On this basis, he argued that the task of social democracy, “instead of speculating on the great economic crash”, was “to organize the working class politically and develop them as a democracy and to fight for all reforms ….”. Bernstein emphasised that “...democracy is a condition of socialism … it is not only the means but also the substance;” a point for which he was severely criticized, among others and notably, by Rosa Luxemburg.

Along with Bernstein, Kautsky was a main author of the Erfurt Program, which advocated a parliamentary road to socialism. With Bernstein’s break with Marxism, Kautsky distanced himself from him. Kautsky was against both the right and the left wings of the German Social Democratic Party; he neither reduced socialism to a series of reforms, nor did he believe that it was attainable through a rapid revolution of a minority. He believed that the working class should capture political power through democratic means, and criticized the Bolsheviks policies, provoking Lenin’s harshest personal attacks. Kautsky questioned the capacity of the Russian working class to immediately establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. His most important emphasis was on democracy, for him “[d]emocracy is not merely a pathway to the Socialist goal. It is an integral part of that goal, which is not only economic welfare but also freedom and equality for all.” While he strongly advocated a parliamentary road to socialism, he did not limit all political action to parliament. We read, “A parliament that does not derive its support from the mass of the people is powerless. On the other hand, the people in a parliamentary state that leaves its fate exclusively in the hands of the parliament is likewise impotent.” He alluded that “Marx acknowledged the necessity for the parliament in modern politics, but just as much the necessity of pressure on the parliament from without.”

In a less developed setting, in Russia, socialist reformism was promoted mainly by Georgi Plekhanov and then the Mensheviks. Plekhanov, who was originally an advocate of revolutionary populism inspired by the socialized structure of Russian villages, rejected its revolutionary potentials and understood that for attaining socialism, Russia should go through a two-stage revolution: first, a democratic revolution to eradicate the Tsarist rule, dominance of the remnants of feudal aristocracy, and the development of capitalism and the move to a socialist revolution. He believed that since the Russian capitalist class was weak, the first stage would need to be led by the working class. Also recognizing the latter’s weaknesses, Plekhanov laid strong emphasis on the role of intellectuals in educating and organizing the working class. During the 1905 revolution and intensification of divisions between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, he sided with the latter, criticizing Lenin and Bolshevik policies. After the 1917 February Revolution, with some initial hesitations he considered it a bourgeois democratic revolution. He criticized Lenin’s “April Theses,” the October Revolution and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks.  The Mensheviks, including Julius Martov, agreed with Plekhanov’s two-stage revolution, but believed that the first stage should be led by the capitalists with workers’ participation. Considering the stage of development of Russia, the Mensheviks rejected the idea of an immediate socialist revolution and advocated for a gradualist parliamentary approach to socialism.

Another trend in socialist reformism emerged from sections of Austrian Marxists. Although most of them, notably Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Max Adler, and Rudolf Hilferding, originally belonged to the left wing of the social democratic movement, some of them particularly Hilferding, changed their position. Hilferding, along with Kautsky was a member of the “Socialization Commission” of the German Social Democratic Party, whose suggestions were ignored by the party. Although he had joined the left-wing Independents, he refused to join the Communist Party of Germany, and in the same manner that he had criticized the Bolsheviks for establishing a “totalitarian state”, criticized the German Communists. A most prominent Marxist economist of his time, Hilferding questioned the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism, arguing that the continued concentration and centralization of capital and the emergence of finance capital has led to “organized capitalism”. He argued that “[t]he tendency of finance capital is to establish social control of production …. [and]  [t]he socializing function of finance capital facilitates enormously the task of overcoming capitalism.” He concluded that “[i]n the violent clash of these hostile interests the dictatorship of the magnates of capital will finally be transformed into the dictatorship of the proletariat.” He believed that a democratic state under the control of the parliament would be able to replace the capitalist state and establish socialism. An important aspect of the Austro Marxist theorists’ contribution to socialist reformism was related to the transformations taking place in the structures of social classes. In his piece on the metamorphosis of the working class, Max Adler argued that the working class did not develop the way Marx had anticipated; neither did it become more united, nor more revolutionary, and its internal stratifications had grown so much that it was hard to talk of a single class. Karl Renner was among the earliest theorists to discuss the emergence of a new social strata, the “service class”. He further argued that trade union struggles had made part of the working class more privileged, and the working class was no longer like the one depicted in the Capital. 

In Italy, the “Italian road to socialism” was propagated by Palmiro Togliatti, the successor of Antonio Gramsci, based on his selected reading of Gramsci, focusing on cultural means for attaining socialism.  It is true that Gramsci was very much impressed with the Bolshevik Revolution --famously writing “Revolution against ‘Capital”-- and advocated for the establishment of a similar party in Italy, and later during the Biennio Rosso (the Two Red Years) was the most important supporter and theoretician of the Turin Council movements.  But many of the ideas developed in his later years, reflected in the Prison Notebooks, have major elements of gradualism and socialist reformism of a different type. Almost all major concepts introduced by Gramsci, including “passive revolution”, “counter hegemony”, democratic “transformism”, “war of position”,  “molecular modifications”, “consent”, “mass consciousness”, and creating “historical bloc”, involve a long process of education, organization and preparation for transition from capitalism. Analyzing the Italian Risorgimento, he compared the reformist Cavour, “the exponent of passive revolution and war of position”, with the revolutionary Mazzini, “the exponent of popular initiative and war of maneuver”, and while pointing to the indispensability of both, he acknowledged that it was Cavour who succeeded in the task of unifying Italy. In a sense, for him civil society should first become socialist before being able to establish the socialist state, and this long process of “revolution without revolution” involves constant and progressive movements from one position to another, towards replacing the dominant hegemony and moving toward socialism. Another significant aspect of Gramsci in this regard is that he was the first Marxist theorist to recognize and analyze Fordism and the major changes taking place in the production process, labour process and capitalism. 

Reformist Parties

German Social Democratic Party: From Gotha to Godesberg and Beyond

The German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the oldest Marxist-inspired party, emerged as a result of several mergers and splits among different German socialist factions, dating back to 1863, when the General German Workers’ Association (ADAV) was formed by followers of Lassalle, Marx and Bakunin. In 1869, the left-wing Marxists separated and formed the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) in Eisenach, and with the introduction of universal male suffrage, both parties participated in the 1872 elections, neither succeeding in attracting the majority of working class votes. This led to their reunification in Gotha in 1875 and the creation of the Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany (SDAP), which in 1890 adopted the name Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP). Marx wrote the harsh “Critique of the Gotha Program” and while brilliantly criticizing some theoretical problems of the program, ridiculed its political demands as “echo of bourgeois” and “old democratic litany.” The fact was that Marxists were a minority in the new party and had make concessions for the unity program or leave the union, and as the 1872 elections had proved, would not be able to attract the majority of the working class. There were no huge differences between many of Gotha political demands and those of the Eisenachers’ program, and it is not clear why Marx had not criticized the latter when it was announced several years earlier. Marx was unhappy because of the prevalence of Lassallean views in the program, and among others, the lack of vision for post-capitalist society. The SDAP had a huge success in the 1877 elections but was soon faced with Bismarck’s anti-socialist law which banned the party.

With the removal of Bismarck and the resumption of party activities in 1891, the SDP approved the more radical Erfurt Program, perceiving the immediate collapse of capitalism, the need for socialization of the means of production and ending class rule, but espousing a reformist and not revolutionary path to socialism. In the span of three decades and in one of the most critical periods that involved several splits and witnessed a world war, two revolutions, and the establishment of the Weimar republic with socialists at the helm, this program was the formal guiding statement of the party. The SPD had become the largest party in Germany, with the largest number of seats in the Reichstag. However, as discussed elsewhere, with the beginning of World War I, internal strife intensified. Realizing that most of the working class supported the “defence of the fatherland”, the SPD opportunistically voted for the war credits. This led to the first schism, and the left wing of the party, the Spartacists, the revisionists and centrists separated and formed the Independent Social Democratic Party (USDP). After the 1918 Revolution, for a short while the two parties joined forces in the “Council of People’s Commissars,” but they could not agree on economic and social policies. Soon the Spartacists and the left wing of the USDP, angry with the right-wing SPD and its concessions to the military, separated and formed the German Communist Party (KPD), calling for an immediate socialist revolution and the establishment of a council republic. The disastrous uprising in January 1919 and the brutal suppression and killing of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht severely weakened the left-wing socialists. The KPD push for a proletarian revolution was at a time when the vast majority of workers were members of the right-wing SPD. As Ryder notes, of the 490 delegates of the Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council which voted for the parliamentary republic rather than the council republic, only 10 were Spartacists. While most analysts blame only one side, Nicholas Vrousalis, in his compelling arguments in “Council Erfurtianism,” rightly pointed out that the only feasible and desirable alternative to bourgeois democracy in 1918 Germany was a parliamentary democracy supported by workers councils.

Despite severe economic problems, hyperinflation and the payment of war reparations, the coalition of the centre-left had managed to introduce some progressive policies including the eight-hour workday. Major changes taking place after the revolution and the founding of the republic, including the establishment of parliamentary democracy allowing for the activities of many different parties, and the separation of the left wing of the party. The transformation of SPD from opposition to a governing coalition party called for the change of the Erfurt Program. In 1921, the Gorlitz Program, mainly authored by Bernstein, kept the political section of the Erfurt program, but in the theoretical section, while criticizing capitalism, removed reference to the future society. The party believed that with working class support alone it could not succeed in implementing its policies, and needed to attract other social forces affected by capitalism. This coincided with the gradual rise of the extreme right and fascism. The Gorlitz Program, despite being short-lived, was the first step by the SPD to gradually move away from a Marxian perspective.

In 1925, the Heidelberg Program re-adopted some Marxist perspectives in its theoretical section and tried to bring back some of the left-leaning members and voters. However, despite covering a span of several decades in the life of SPD, the program remained on paper. In the presidential elections in the same year, amidst socialist, communists and liberal infighting, a coalition of right-wing parties brought Hindenburg to power, and soon Germany was confronted with the Great Depression. With the success of the Nazi party in the 1932 Reichstag elections, and the subsequent appointment of Hitler as the Chancellor of Germany in 1933, the situation of SPD significantly deteriorated. The socialists and communists who could not agree to work together, were soon facing firing squads, prisons, concentration camps or exile. In exile the surviving partly leaders tried unsuccessfully to gain the support of allied forces. In divided post-war Germany, the social democrats in the East were ordered to join the communists, forming the Socialist Unity Party (SED). In the West, although Americans allowed SPD to operate, they only supported the center-right parties, a policy that was deepened with the Cold War. They also changed the structure of labour unions, weakening their links to political parties.  The Marshall Plan --with West Germany as its third largest recipient-- and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 financed economic recovery and helped rapid industrial and economic development, the rise of the new middle class, economic improvement of the working class, and decline of number of strikes and other industrial actions. The socialist reformists were faced not only with German capitalists who operated more confidently, but also with global capital and US imperial power.

It was in this atmosphere that in 1959 the severely weakened SPD came up with a new program with hopes of expanding its influence. The Godesberg Program shifted the party away from Marxism and socialist reformism, and was a most significant transformation from a party of the working class to that of all people. Despite claiming “democratic socialism”, this was a program of social reform within capitalism. The party gained increasing support and entered different coalitions, the most notable one in 1966 with the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), when the social democrat Karl Schiller was appointed Minister of Economic Affairs and followed Keynesian policies. Improved employment and social safety programs made the SPD very popular, and for the first time in post-Weimar Germany, in a coalition with a liberal party, a social democrat became Chancellor. Under Willy Brandt (1969-1974) significant social democratic reforms took place. Although reforms slowed down under his successor from the right wing of the party, Helmut Schmidt, coinciding with the end of the economic boom, the OPEC crisis, and rise of unemployment, the party remained in power until 1982, when Christian Democrats under Helmut Kohl came to power.

The long reign of Kohl (1982-1998) coincided with the rise of global neoliberalism, Thatcherism, Reaganism, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, elimination of many social reforms, and the imposition of austerity programs. Different factions of the SPD were arguing for revising the party program, and after five years, the center-left Berlin Program was approved in 1989. In less than a decade in a coalition with the Green party, the SPD and Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) came to power, with a completely different agenda. In theory and practice all references to democratic socialism were put aside and an openly neoliberal policy was adopted with the misleading title Neue Mitte (new middle). Schröder’s “Agenda 2010” was a market liberalization program with cuts to both the social benefits of the working class and the taxes of the rich. The strong shift to the right led to a schism and left-leaning members formed a new party and eventually merged into the Die Link (The Left). The current Hamburg Program of 2007, although still claiming some jargon of “democratic socialism,” is the continuation of what Schröder put into practice, influenced by Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair’s “Third Way”, and totally dissociated from socialism.

Swedish Social Democratic Party: From Reformist Socialism to Liberalism

The Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), established in 1889, was originally influenced by socialist ideas evolving in Germany. The first pre-program, which was drafted by August Palm in 1882 before the establishment of the party, was a milder version of the Gotha Program. Later, around 1886, Axel Danielson made some revisions along the same lines. 

In 1897, about a decade after the establishment of the party, the first official program was approved. As Kokk mentions, the program was drafted by Danielson and was influenced by the German Erfurt program. It emphasized democracy and elections and close relations with workers and trade unions. The program had a Marxist perspective, and was openly anti-capitalist, calling for the transition to socialism. Although it had declared itself as a working-class party, it was very different from a Leninist-type party and followed a reformist strategy from the very beginning. The 1897 program was approved at a time when Swedish society was predominantly agricultural, but along with the growth of industry and migration, the working class was growing, and the party’s mass base was expanding. In the same year, SAP had its first member, Hjalmar Branting, in the Riksdag. Later the leader of the party and several-time prime minister, he was influenced by Bernstein and while believing in the need to transition to socialism, saw a direct interconnection between socialism and democracy and sought a non-revolutionary path. 

From the time of the first party program until World War II, the SAP came up with three more programs in 1905, 1911 and 1920. With the introduction of universal suffrage for men in 1911, the SAP was able to win over 35 percent of the Riksdag seats, and pushed for the expansion of Sweden’s welfare system. As of 1914, the SAP became the largest party in parliament. Following the 1917 revolution in Russia, the party faced a major internal schism. Pro-Bolshevik cadres and the youth section of the SAP separated, and later in 1921 with the order of the Comintern, established the Swedish Communist Party (SKP, now the Left Party). The SAP, observing Bolshevik’s policy in Russia and Spartacists/Communists in Germany, moved further and further away from radical policies. From the early 1930, the SAP occupied the largest number of seats in the Riksdag.

Throughout the period following World War II until 1976, the SAP was in power and put forward three more programs in 1944, 1960 and 1975. Sweden’s neutrality during the war had kept its infrastructures and production capabilities intact, and being a recipient of the Marshal Plan, the government was in a good position to expand its industrial base and social programs. Swedish society was changing rapidly, the new middle class was expanding and Sweden was becoming more and more integrated in the global capitalist economy, with the associated consequences.

From its inception Swedish social democracy was closely linked to the labour movement. Although, as Lars Edgren and Lars Olsson note, the proletarianization process had a very slow start, it accelerated and radicalized quickly. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) which was founded in 1898 and comprised of blue-collar unions of different branches of the economy, was a major base of the SAP, and its influence in policy making grew significantly. The Swedish corporatist model, solidaristic wages policy, and eventually the Rehn-Meinder model in 1951 brought the labour movement and SAP closer together. 

Along with the growth of the economy and expansion of government services, there was also a rapid growth of the new middle class. The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO), which was founded in 1944 following the merger of two unions of white-collar employees of the public and private sectors, expanded rapidly and its membership grew almost ten-fold by the mid-1960s. SAP knew that it could not rely solely on LO and blue-collar workers but also needed the support of TCO. Although both categories of workers and employees of these two confederations were to different degrees subjected to capitalist exploitation, their demands were not identical, and the SAP had to make compromises that would affect its main mass base. The powerful Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO), comprised of unions of doctors, engineers, academics and others, was also expanding and SAP was trying to attract its support.

In the post-world war economic boom, the Swedish social democratic model was successful. However, Sweden’s export-based economy was seriously affected by the economic crisis of the 1970s, rising unemployment and the costs of unemployment insurance and government expenditures, along with the decline of government revenues and taxation, forced the government to modify its policies.

After its electoral defeat in 1976, in the period that SAP was either in opposition or was part of a minority government, the party approved three more programs, in 1990, 2001 and 2013. In all these, we witness a growing distance from the first formal party program and its call for the transition from capitalism. While still emphasizing “democratic socialism”, the tone and content of the programs point to reforms of capitalism. Neo-liberal globalization had a strong impact on the Swedish economy and made it harder for big Swedish corporations to compete at the European and global levels. With the growing dominance of global financial capital, Swedish banks demanded less regulation. Despite years of SAP resistance, Sweden eventually joined the EU in 1995, mostly because a growing number of Swedish corporations had moved to other parts of Europe to benefit from lower taxation and fewer regulations. One year later, the social democratic government of Göran Persson, faced with a massive budget deficit, put forward a package with welfare cuts and tax reductions for corporations. Some analysts rightly believed that the EU was a threat to the Swedish welfare system. Although in the 2003 referendum the Swedish people voted against joining the Eurozone, Sweden could not avert the impacts of the EU and globalization in particular. Among others, anytime the government pushed for progressive welfare policies, the major credit-rating agencies (Moody’s and S&P) lowered Sweden’s ranking. 

The gradual weakening of the Swedish model as a result of global neoliberalism coincided with the weakening of the labour movement. The number of blue-collar workers and union intensity, particularly among LO members, was declining. In the 1980s, at about 85 percent union membership, Sweden had the highest union density in the world, but ever since membership has been declining; in 2006 it was at 77 percent, and by 2018 it had fallen to 59 percent. All these weakened the LO in collective bargaining. As the Swedish economy became more and more knowledge-based, highly skilled workers and professional employees demanded better pay and working conditions, and the social democrat’s slogan of equality faced more difficulties.

With these difficulties, SAP constantly retreated from its social democratic policies, adopting liberal and at times neo-liberal policies. In 1994, when it formed yet another minority government, prime minister Ingvar Carlsson formally announced that his party’s neo-liberal policies were in line with EU measures. Taxes on corporations continued to decrease at a time when taxes on wages and salaries were increasing, even above the OECD average. Banking regulations and supervisions relaxed, and in the 2008 crisis Swedish banks like banks in most other advanced capitalist countries were close to bankruptcy and had to be rescued by the government. The growing dominance of finance capital was in sharp contrast with SAP’s programs that once called for banking and credit regulation, socialization and social control.

The upsurge of right-wing sentiments, most notably as a result of increased immigration from the developing world, created further problems for the SAP, and the social democratic government was forced to modify immigration policy. The ultra-right-wing Sweden Democrats (SD), which had entered the Riksdag in 2010, gained still more momentum and in the 2018 elections won 17.5 percent of votes. In these elections, SAP gained only 28 percent of votes, the lowest level in over a century. Right-wing sentiments were not limited to the upper and middle classes, and with the decline of the Social Democratic Party, workers more and more voted for right-wing parties. For example, in the 2010 elections, only 50 percent of the LO members voted for the social democrats, and the figure for members of TCO was 26 percent and those of SACO, 18 percent.

Despite its many achievements in establishing a highly advanced welfare system, in face of advances of global capital and massive transformations taking place at the national and international levels, Swedish social democracy progressively distanced itself from its original ideals. With all these retreats, the party that once counted over a million members increasingly lost its mass base. Undoubtedly part of the failure has to do with the objective and structural realities that it faced, but it also relates to its own inactions and lack of necessary radicalism. Just having progressive positions and programs are not enough to gain the support of the majority. If it was so, the Swedish Left Party which has had far more progressive and radical positions as a socialist, feminist and environmentalist party, should have gained major popular support. In the 2018 elections, it only won eight percent of the votes (28 seats), less than half of the ultra-right SD party. Limited extra-parliamentary activities, failure to create a counter hegemony against the right-wing tendencies among the working and middle classes, bureaucratism and failure to restructure the party by adopting new modes of organizing in labour and neighbourhood organizations and social movements, “ministerialism” and insistence to be part of any coalition in forming minority governments, and the widening gap between the right and left-wing social democrats severely weakened the SAP and led to its continual decline.

French Socialism: From “Rupture with Capitalism” to Rupture with Socialism

Aside from earlier socialisms dating back to the Great French Revolution and thinkers like Saint-Simon and Fourier, and the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871, the history of socialism in France is replete with the emergence of parties, alliances and schisms. From the inception there were both revolutionary and reformist socialist tendencies, among them, the intransigeants and the possibilistes.

In 1879, eight years after the disastrous defeat of the Paris Commune, the first reformist socialist organization in France, the Federation of Socialist Workers of France (FTSF) was established. Unhappy with the gradualist policies of the Federation, the following year the more radical Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue founded the French Workers’ Party (POF) with Marxist tendencies. The preamble discussing the “maximum” section, as was mentioned earlier, was dictated by Marx, and it was in this section that Marx referred to the possibility of transformation of universal suffrage from an instrument of deception into an instrument of emancipation. For Marx, the minimum program provided “practical means of agitation around demands that were achievable within the framework of capitalism.”

In 1902, two separate socialist parties with almost identical names emerged out of the mergers of several groups: the reformist French Socialist Party, led by figures such as Jean Jaures, and the more radical Socialist Party of France which was the result of the merger of POF and a Blanquist revolutionary current led by Edouard Vaillant. By 1903 the two parties grew closer together and in 1905, with encouragements from the Second International, they formed the French Section of the Workers International (SFIO). Despite the inevitable internal disputes, SFIO developed relations with the powerful General Confederation of Labour (CGT), though a sizable number of CGT members considered the SFIO to be too radical. They avoided joining and in 1911 created a separate reformist party. With the coming of the First World War, despite its earlier anti-militarist polices, like other socialist parties of Europe, the SFIO supported the government’s war efforts. The assassination of Jean Jaures by an ultra-nationalist had weakened the anti-war camp. After the Russian October Revolution of 1917, dispute over Bolshevik policies led to a major split in SFIO and eventually in 1920 the French Section of the Communist International (SFIC) was established, and later became the Communist Party of France (PCF).

Between the two world wars, the SFIO on several occasions either participated in coalition governments called the Cartel of the Left, or just supported them. In 1924, the Cartel won the elections and put forward significant reforms. These reforms scared the right wing, led to capital flight from France, and the eventual downfall of the coalition. The Grand coalition and the creation of the Popular Front against Fascism won the 1936 elections with Leon Blum as Prime Minister. Among the most important reforms of this period was the Matignon Accord which was signed between the CGT and the CGPF (manufacturers’ association), recognizing the right to strike, unionization, collective bargaining, and wage increases, and a forty-hour work week. Despite these achievements, as a result of internal conflicts leading to another split in the left, along with economic problems, Blum’s government was short-lived. The SFIO was also confronted with the strengthening of its right-wing members.

The German occupation of parts of France and the establishment of the Vichy government led to the erosion of many of the reforms put in place by the socialists. Worse yet, it was a most serious blow to socialists, many of whom were killed while some collaborated with Fascists, some tagged as attentistes withdrew from actions awaiting change of circumstances, and many joined the resistance, particularly when the Vichy government decided to send Leon Blum to a Nazi concentration camp. When the Fascists were defeated, the SFIO reorganized itself, and purged collaborators and those who had not joined the resistance.

Following the liberation of France, the provisional government put forward a set of reforms and among others, nationalized several economic institutions and banks that had collaborated with the Nazis. From 1944-1947 a tri-partite coalition of the PCF, SFIO, and Christian Democrats (MRP) played a most significant role in French politics. When in 1946 Charles de Gaulle resigned as the head of the provisional government, Felix Gouin, a leader of the SFIO replaced him. It was in this short-lived period that additional major social reforms were introduced, including the forty-hour work week and extension of work councils to firms with 50 or over employees. During the unstable post-war Fourth Republic, the SFIO managed to form two coalition governments, Paul Ramadier’s in 1947 and Guy Mollet’s in 1956. Both introduced important progressive reforms in France, while ironically following reactionary colonial policies; Ramadier expelled the Communists from the cabinet for opposing the Indochina war, and Mollet had a most influential role in France’s efforts to suppress the Algerian liberation movement and making war with Egypt following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Overall, despite reforms introduced in the immediate post-war era, the period was plagued with successive crises of hyperinflation, unemployment, raw materials shortages, budget deficits, and infrastructure problems. To tackle these issues, the so-called dirigiste governments increased their intervention, a trend that continued in part of the Fifth Republic. The Marshall Plan, of which France was a major recipient, helped the economy but required limited government intervention and regulations, and brought France closer to US policies. Yet government continued its statist policies and particularly during the tenure of Andre Philip as socialist Minister of Industry, many industries including the Bank of France, gas and electricity and some insurance companies were brought under government control, though without any regulation and public participation. French corporatism compared to Germany and Holland involved much limited workers’ participation, and was mainly based on collaboration between government and corporations. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed rapid economic and population expansion, along with the growth of the new middle class, and increased influence of capitalists.

The 1950s saw the gradual weakening of the SFIO and the broadening of internal conflicts among socialists. New organizations emerged as a result of splits and fusions, including the Autonomous Socialist Party (PSA), and Socialist Left Union (UGS), which later merged together along with a group separating from the PCF and formed the Unified Socialist Party (PSU). The return of de Gaulle to power in 1958 and changes made to the political system with direct elections of the president in 1962 created further problems for the socialists and left coalitions. In much of the 1960s French socialism was very weakened and had no specific strategy.

A major turning point in French socialism was in 1969, when the much-weakened SFIO and several other organizations formed the Socialist Party of France (PS). With the assumption of leadership by Francois Mitterrand in 1971, socialists’ activities gained momentum. A left-wing coalition of the PS, PCF and the Left Radical Party (PRG) in 1972 put forward a radical joint program calling for, among others, nationalization of  key industries, workers’ participation, lowering working hours, increased wages and expansion of social security. Three factions evolved in the Socialist Party: the left faction led by Jean-Pierre Chevenement pushed for revolutionary socialism, the center-left led by Mitterrand pressed for major reforms, and the center-right led by Michel Rocard followed a policy of reforming the market economy.

In 1981, Francois Mitterrand became the first Socialist to be elected to the office of President, and served until 1995, longer than any other President in the history of France. Using the presidential authorities of the Fifth Republic, Mitterrand pushed for significant radical reforms. He believed that the socialist party should be more radicalized both in theory and practice, and firmly pushed for the “110 Propositions for France,” a set of very ambitious and progressive propositions covering foreign, European and national polices. In the first year of his presidency most of the socialist party's elections promises were put into practice, notably, the minimum wage was raised by 55 percent, working week hours were reduced to 39 (the first step towards 35 hours), minimum guaranteed pension was raised by 65 percent, unemployment insurance was raised, and retirement age was reduced to 60 years. Part of these reforms was, of course, related to the reaction to the structural and technological changes taking place in industries that had led to job losses and the party’s attempts to lessen the effects of unemployment. 

All these reforms were introduced during the oil crisis, and more importantly, as neo-liberalism was on the rise. Thatcherism had become the dominant policy in Britain, and in the first year of the Mitterrand presidency, Ronald Reagan had come to power in the USA. Despite all these, and internal factional conflicts in the socialist party, Mitterrand steadfastly pushed for the reforms. Soon, however, the socialist government was faced with serious economic problems. Increased taxation could not cover the rising costs of these programs, leading to major budget deficits, and increased costs of production had created problems for the sale and export of French products. Aside from internal economic problems, changes in the global economy and France’s membership in the European Monetary System (EMS; later the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU), had put a set of constraints that the government could not ignore.

Overreacting to these problems, in 1982 Mitterrand drastically changed course and moved towards imposing serious austerity measures. This strong retreat from earlier policies angered the party’s mass base, and in 1986 the socialist party lost its majority in the National Assembly to a right-wing coalition, and the communists also withdrew their support. As a result, through the cohabitation system, Mitterrand had to assign a Prime minister from the Gaullist Party. Many reforms were reversed, among them, various profit-making nationalized industries were returned to the private sector. Despite these problems, Mitterrand was reelected in 1988 and followed moderate policies, but was soon faced with the European-wide economic recession of the early 1990s.

Following losing the Presidential elections in 1995, except for the period when Lionel Jospin became Prime Minister in a cohabitation government from 1997 to 2002, socialists were pushed out of power until 2012. Despite all political and financial constraints, Jospin introduced some important reforms, improving social security and reducing working hours. Yet, as Ben Clift notes, he was aware that he could not follow economic policies independent of limits imposed by the European Union.  The Presidency of Francois Hollande with his “Agenda of Change” was plagued with rising unemployment, budget deficits, and growing government debts. Nevertheless, he put forward some reforms including lowering the retirement age which the Gaullist government had increased, and expanding government hiring. European regulations including the EDP (Excessive Deficit Procedure) had limited the annual government borrowing to three percent of GDP and their total indebtedness to 60 percent, and Hollande had to revise some of his policies as a result. Worse yet, in the first year of his presidency, the credit-rating agencies (Moody’s and S&P) reduced France’s rating, creating further problems for Hollande’s programs. In reaction to the socialist government’s decision to levy 75 percent taxes on incomes of over one million Euro, many millionaires left France, and 2013 saw a sizable capital flight. All these problems forced Hollande to reverse course. The most controversial policy was the revisions made in the Labour Code, among others, facilitating layoffs. His presidency was also marred with immigration issues and terrorists’ attack, which saw the growing influence of the ultra-right. In the 2017 elections the socialists lost the presidency and 286 seats in the national Assembly.

With its rise and decline in the span of over a century, and in face of internal and international obstacles, French socialism moved away from its original policy of transition from capitalism, limited itself to reforms within the capitalist system, and despite important achievements, failed even in expanding these reforms. The increased power of global capital, changes in the class structure of France, and socialists’ failure to expand their social base among the working class and the new middle class were among the main reasons for their failures. No doubt, the unique characteristics of the French working class have been another factor in limiting more radical policies, particularly the extremely low level of union intensity (about 10 percent), despite several major competing confederations such as the CGT, CFDT, CFTC, and FO, each with degrees of affiliation with different political parties. Internal divisions and separation of the more radical members from the party, among them Jean-Pierre Chevenement and supporters in 1993, the creation of the Left Party (PG, Parti de Gauche) led by Jean-Luc Melanchon in 2008 and later the formation of the FI (La France insoumise) party in 2016, while maintaining a radical and progressive platform in French politics, allowed the further dominance of the right-wing in the Socialist Party.

Issues Affecting the Demise of Socialist Reformisms

All the major cases of socialist reformisms point to a set of factors that in the span of over a century and a half led to the rise and demise of reformist movements. Unlike the earlier structure/agency debates of the New Left, including E. P. Thompson’s criticism of Louis Althusser’s “anti-humanist structuralism,” focusing primarily on the supremacy of intentions and human agency over structural constraints, these factors have been both structural and agential. While the impact of structural constraints on the conducts and behaviours of human actors and agents are undeniable, and indeed most of the factors mentioned below have been structural, the role of human agency in creating social and political changes have also been significant. Marx’s third and eleventh theses on Feuerbach emphasise the role of agency (“...circumstances are changed by men ...” and “… the point is to change [the world]”). Yet, human actions take place within the bounds of structural constraints; as Marx writes, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please . . . and under self-selected circumstances . . ..” 

“Everlasting uncertainty” or “organized capitalism”?

In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels had rightly pointed to the “[c]onstant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation…” of capitalist society. Certainly “crises” have always been an integral part of capitalist development, but at the same time, with apparatuses at its disposal, capital has consistently been able to adjust, survive, and continue to grow. As Rudolf Hilferding called it over a century ago, “organized capitalism,” global oligopolies along with capitalist states’ interventions and regulations, have lessened and managed the effects of the crises. In modern times, global institutions such as The World Bank, IMF and WTO, along with the central banks of advanced capitalist countries, the European Central Bank, credit-rating agencies, and multi-national banks and corporations, are among global mechanisms of organized capitalism, not to mention the backing of the military apparatus, NATO. It is true that none of these have been and will be able to make capitalism crises-free, but as long as they are not seriously challenged by anti-capitalist forces, they will continue to sustain the capitalist system. Confronting capitalism today is far more complicated than ever before, and social democratic and socialist parties cannot ignore the constraints imposed on them by the forces of global capital.

“Two class” society or more?

In The Communist Manifesto we also read that “[s]ociety as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps”, and that in the “same proportion” that the bourgeoisie is developed, the proletariat also develops, not only increasing in number, but also in its strength and organization. This was no doubt the situation in the earlier stages of capitalist development. But as capitalism has grown, the industrial working class has shrunk in size and strength. Moreover, elements of other social classes, including the traditional middle class, “small tradespeople, shopkeepers, handicraftsmen and peasants,” despite their contractions, continue their existence.  So does the “dangerous class”, the lumpen proletariat which continues to function as a “tool of reactionary intrigue”. But the most significant change in the class structure of modern capitalism has been the emergence and growing influence of the new middle class, the salariat in public and private institutions. Austrian Marxists, as mentioned earlier, were among the first to recognize the “service class”. While the elements of this multi-layered class sell their mental labour and have similar relations with capital as the working class, enticing some analysts to simply categorize them under the working class, their social status, lifestyle and demands are very different. Hence, all social democratic parties that earlier placed their sole focus on the working class had to redirect their attention to these new strata. But they failed to find an optimum response to the conflicting demands of the working class and the different strata of the new middle class. 

“Equalized” or Differentiated Conditions of the Working class?

The Communist Manifesto affirmed that the “[c]onditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour…”. This condition also changed as capitalism continued its advances. In the early stages of industrialization during the era of competitive capitalism, the general tendency was towards homogenization, simplification and standardization of industrial processes that reduced reliance on skilled labour. This tendency continued in the early stages of monopoly capitalism, and even during the early stages of Fordism. However, with the full dominance of monopoly capital, labour markets increasingly became segmented and heterogenous. Even within these primary and secondary markets, significant differentiations based on gender, race and ethnicity have taken place. Geographical differences in the case of workers within a global network of multinational corporations are also noteworthy.  The development of the gig economy with all its unique characteristics, and the emergence of what Ursula Huws called cybertaria, hugely added to the unequal and differentiated conditions of the working class. All these differentiations have had a big impact on the working class and its capability to organize a united front against capital.

Welfare state, Fordism and Post-Fordism

The working and living conditions of the working classes today, at least in advanced industrial societies, are very different from that in the early stages of capitalist development as portrayed by Engels or presented in the Capital. The Manifesto also posited that “pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth.” However, the growth of mass consumption corresponding to mass production, first reflected in Fordism, improved wages. Many of the capitalist countries were also colonial and imperialist powers, and while intensifying the exploitation of their own workers, could also use part of the massive economic gains from the colonies to improve the conditions of these workers. The development of social security programs, in part thanks to the struggles of organized labour and socialists, and the establishment of welfare states in a growing number of countries, particularly after WWII, further improved the conditions of the working class in these countries. The post-Fordist era, with major organizational changes including the breakdown of the industrial process into clusters of smaller and medium-sized industries scattered around the globe, put an end to the large factories which Lenin had called “proletarian fortresses”.

World Wars, Bolshevism, Fascism, Cold War

Although World War I prepared the ground for social democrats coming to power in Germany, it devasted the economy. War reparations depleted the country’s finances, and large numbers of the working class were eliminated. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, while initially raising hopes for socialists, had a huge weakening impact in creating schisms within social democratic parties, and the departure of radical and left-wing elements. The rise of Fascism, which was not initially taken seriously by social democrats, struck a most terrible blow to socialist reformism. After World War II, when all social democratic parties were in total disarray and many of their leading figures had been killed, the US and Allied forces only helped the right-wing parties. The Cold War further complicated the situation for these parties. While the mere existence of the Soviet Union had instigated the expansion of welfare programs in Europe in line with the policies of social democratic parties, the growing influence and dominance of the US and its support of right-wing parties weakened the positions of the social democrats.

Patriotism and Nationalism

The Manifesto had declared that “working men have no country,” and that “[n]ational differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing….” While this may be true of the future of humanity, it was obviously not the case during the World Wars. When the Second International was formed in 1889, its obvious aim was internationalism. As Michael Harrington notes, when in 1913 socialist representatives of Europe gathered in a meeting in Switzerland, they promised that in the name of international solidarity of the working classes they would never fight with each other. But in only one year they were confronted by a most brutal war. The fact was that while socialists did not much care about nationalism, their mass base, the working class, did. An important reason why most German social democrats voted for the war credits in 1914 was because the vast majority of German workers strongly favoured the defense of the “fatherland”, and the party opportunistically followed their wishes.

“Red Family” or Homo-neoliberalus?

Gramsci had rightly pointed out that capitalist rationality created a new type of human suitable for the new type of work and production process. Beyond this, the dominant capitalist ideology and its massive and powerful apparatuses turned capitalist values, individualism and consumerism into the dominant culture. With the dominance of neo-liberalism, the lonely, insecure and selfish individual replaced the ideal socialist human. As Dietrich Orlow noted, the expectation was that in the process of transition from decaying capitalism, the “red family” of workers and their descendants would become immune to capitalist values. However, many socialists painfully realized the reality that not only were many workers not immune to capitalist values, but they in fact had no objections to them.

“Ministerialism” or “Revolutionary Opposition”

From early on, the debate among many socialists was whether to join any coalition government to push for their desired policies, a phenomenon that came to be known as ministerialism, or act as “revolutionary opposition”, as Marx had suggested during the Communist League period. Other than a few exceptions when social democratic parties had a chance to form majority governments, they either had to form minority governments or coalitions with other parties, often with the center right. These choices involved major concessions and diversions from their electoral policies and promises, discrediting them in the eyes of their mass bases.  

Limited Extra-Parliamentary Activities

Most social democratic parties spent much of their resources and energies in the electoral process on gaining more seats in parliament and were less concerned with cultural and political activities in civil society, communities and neighbourhoods. They created organizations for different social groups such as women and youth, which often were just appendages of the party for promoting party policies, and not independent democratic structures for mobilizing and articulating the demands and aspirations of these social groups to influence policy making of the party.

Bureaucracy and Oligarchy

What Robert Michels called “the iron law of oligarchy” also applied to all social democratic parties. Although Michels’s belief in the inevitability of bureaucracy has been proven wrong by modern theories of organization and were even criticized by many socialists including Bukharin and Gramsci, what he envisaged as the consequence of inflexible hierarchical structures led by organizational elites, proved true of social democratic parties and workers’ unions. Although these parties were not as strict as Bolshevik-type “democratic centralism”, they were nonetheless bureaucratic, with very limited internal democracy and accountability. The rigid structures enabled a degree of corruption and opportunism, and lacked decentralized semi-autonomous units, failing to mobilize, organize and create a counter-culture among its mass base.

In sum, the combination of the above-mentioned structural and agential factors determined the demise of once mighty political organizations, and more importantly made the case for questioning the strategies of traditional socialist reformism.

New Challenges and Opportunities

There is no denying that socialists face greater challenges today than perhaps ever before. Arguably, at no other time in the past has capital been so globally dominant in all economic, political and cultural aspects of life. Backed by powerful capitalist states and international financial institutions, mega corporations roam the globe and ceaselessly expand their operations. Neo-liberalism is the dominant ideology throughout the world. The global public sphere is dominated by powerful media and digital platforms controlled by the biggest and fastest growing corporations the world has ever seen. Aside from these economic and ideological apparatuses, repressive apparatuses, the war machine, military alliances, armies of major capitalist countries and private security firms move to any part of the globe to maintain the status-quo.

Yet, at no other time have we witnessed such diverse crises. Global warming and natural disasters have wreaked havoc on every continent; unemployment and precarious employment have turned into a new way of life; the growing influence of religious fundamentalisms of different sorts --Islamic, Hindu, Jewish and Christian-- supported by conservative right wing elements and organizations and reactionary social movements and right-wing populisms are alarmingly winning over a growing number of the disenfranchised citizens.

These realities, while creating serious challenges for the left, also provide new opportunities. The problem, however, is that the socialist left is weak and dispersed, and in the countries that it is allowed to operate, it is limited to small organizations, and in many cases confined to academia and a few left journals. Also, more than ever before, the working class is segmented and dispersed in clusters of mostly union-free small and medium industries, with growing numbers increasingly joining the “cybertariat”. The linkages between the left and working class and middle classes are also minimal and, in many cases, non-existent.

On the positive side, we now have progressive social movements that range from environmentalist, feminist, anti-racist and LGBTQ ones to anti-globalist and still other ones. More significantly, the expansion of social media has provided many great opportunities for the progressive left. Although they are no match for the massive propaganda and indoctrinating machines of the right-wing, conservatives, and liberals, they have provided an important forum through which the left can propagate its views and critiques of capitalism.

However, the problem is that aside from organizational weaknesses and absence of linkages with a mass-base, socialists suffer from theoretical ambiguities and confusion about how to take advantage of the new opportunities, and what is to be done for (re-)gaining the strength to move forward. Aside from the old revolutionary and reformist dogmas promoted by some political organizations and journals, new theoretical works are emerging. Among others, mention can be made of works by John Holloway, Axel Honneth, Bhaskar Sunkara and a short piece by Vivek Chibber. Although each of these theorists, working within very different paradigms, offer important innovative ideas that are helpful for formulating a theory of transition, there are many ambiguities in their works, particularly on the questions of “how” and with “whose support” the final goal of transition to socialism can be achieved. Discussing the strength and weaknesses of these works, and the whole question of what is to be done is a subject of separate paper.

Since both the revolutionary and reformist paths to socialism have failed, and in the absence of a third alternative, the key question is which modified version of these two strategies might have a better chance of hindering the continued march of capital, and lead the way towards socialism? As I have discussed elsewhere, the proponents of an immediate transition to socialism, particularly the advocates of revolutionary rupture, have not specified how they will be able to immediately move to their imagined post-capitalist society, and with which political forces they would be able to do so. As a result of huge imbalances of power, a frontal “war of maneuver” is not possible except in artistic and literary creations, and so the only viable strategy is what Gramsci called “passive revolution” and “war of position.” This is a radical gradualist and reformist strategy that involves constant education, mobilization and organization of a growing number of socialists among the working class, the new middle classes and identitarian movements towards establishing a “counter hegemony” and using parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means for gaining more influence in the public sphere and moving in the direction of political power. This strategy, different from traditional reformism, melds aspects of militancy of the revolutionary approach with the pragmatism of incremental reform, with the combined struggles and activities of socialists in a growing number of countries ultimately pushing back global capital and progressively moving towards a post-capitalist society.