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Two Ways of Looking
at Fascism
By Matthew N. Lyons
Introduction
Fascism is an important political category, but a confusing one. People
use the word fascism in many different ways, and often without a clear
sense of what it means.
Political events since the September 11, 2001, attacks have raised the
issue of fascism in new ways. People on both the right and the left have
described Islamic rightist forces such as al Qaeda and the Taliban as
fascist -– but for very different reasons. Neoconservatives and
Bush administration officials have denounced “Islamofascists”
to help justify the so-called war on terrorism and the military occupations
of Iraq and Afghanistan. By contrast, some leftists describe some of these
same groups as fascist -– not to rationalize U.S. expansion, but
to highlight the fact that there are major political forces today that
are deadly enemies of both the left and U.S. imperialism.
At the same time, a number of liberals and leftists have warned that the
United States itself is headed in a fascist direction. As I’ve argued
elsewhere, the Bush administration's authoritarian and militaristic policies
are a serious threat, but they’re a world apart from fascism's volatile
mix of oppression and anti-elitism, order and insurgency. Fascism doesn’t
just terrorize and repress; it uses twisted versions of radical politics
in a bid to “take the game away from the left,” as neonazi
leader Tom Metzger urged his followers in the 1980s. We need different
strategies to fight these different forms of right-wing authoritarianism,
and we need a political vocabulary that lets us tell them apart.1
Claims of impending fascism tend to reflect two underlying problems.
The first is the idea that fascism is essentially a tool or strategy of
big business to defend capitalist rule, and the second is vagueness about
what delineates fascism from other forms of capitalist repression. We
can see both of these problems in pronouncements from several different
U.S. leftist organizations (such as the Communist Party, Socialist Workers
Party, Revolutionary Communist Party, and Socialist Labor Party), in leftist
and left-liberal media organs such as CounterPunch and Common Dreams,
and in numerous websites and online discussions among U.S. activists.2
A recent sophisticated example of both problems comes from Marxist academicians
Gregory Meyerson and Michael Joseph Roberto. In an October 2006 Monthly
Review article, “It Could Happen Here,” they argue that “fascism
is a plausible response by the U.S. bourgeoisie to the general crisis
of Pax Americana” and, although the outcome of the crisis remains
unclear, “evidence is mounting for what we are calling a fascist
trajectory.” Meyerson and Roberto see fascism as an intrinsic structural
tendency of capitalism in crisis, a form of rule that is promoted strictly
from the top down. “Only the ruling class can institute fascist
processes,” they argue. Although they acknowledge the existence
of fascist movements, “the Marxist view,” they claim, “does
not focus primarily on fascist mass movements because they are not primary
engines of fascism.”3
Even if we accept this concept of fascism (and of Marxism), Meyerson and
Roberto never explain concretely what they mean by fascist rule. They
emphasize that fascism needs to be understood in functional terms, as
a form of capitalist rule in crisis, and they criticize descriptive definitions
of fascism on the grounds that these obscure its changing historical character.
A U.S. fascist trajectory “will look quite different from past fascist
trajectories,” and will “unfold in a bipartisan context, liberals
and conservatives acting in concert -– the whole ruling class.”
But since Meyerson and Roberto don’t tell us what fascism will look
like, how will we know it’s happening? The substance of their argument
seems to be that the growing crisis may persuade most representatives
of capital that they need to establish a much more repressive and authoritarian
state. This is a serious and wholly justified concern, but it’s
a simple point that doesn’t require elaborate arguments about functionalism
and structural tendencies. And we gain nothing, but lose much, by calling
the result fascism.
The concept of fascism is indeed highly relevant for analyzing current
political threats, but not in the way that Meyerson and Roberto maintain.
Fascism can help us understand a range of political phenomena that the
U.S. ruling class didn’t initiate and does not control. These phenomena
are part of a crisis that goes far beyond the decline of U.S. global hegemony
and the American welfare state, to include the following:
- across eastern Europe and northern Asia, the collapse of the Soviet
bloc, followed in many countries by a drastic decline of living standards
and the rise of large-scale criminality and a host of right-wing nationalist
movements
- in many parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the cooptation or
defeat of revolutionary leftist insurgencies and governments and the growth
of diverse populist or religious-based oppositional forces
- in much of the world, the acceleration of capitalist globalization dynamics
such as capital flight, international mass migration, commodification
of women's labor, the growth of international mass culture, and the erosion
of traditional local institutions –- and the upsurge of ambivalent
or hostile responses to all of these from various points on the political
spectrum.
In this volatile mix, fascism is an important reference point -–
not just as a developed political force but also as a tendency or potential
within broader movements. It is both distinct from and at odds with top-down
capitalist authoritarianism. In addition, while fascism takes shape in
a capitalist context, it isn’t a functional consequence of capitalist
development, analogous (as Meyerson and Roberto suggest) to imperialism.
Rather, it is a political current, which -– like socialism, liberalism,
or conservatism –- embodies its own set of ideas, policies, organizational
forms, and bases of support. Like all major political currents, fascism
exists in multiple variations and evolves dynamically to address new historical
conditions. This means that no definition of fascism is the one true,
final answer. But defining –- or at least describing –- fascism
can help us to grasp fascism's key features, delineate its relationship
with other forces, and explore how it develops and how it can be fought.
Unlike many discussions among left activists in the United States today,
this essay offers a concept of fascism that speaks to its double-edged
reality –- bolstering oppression and tyranny but also tapping into
real popular grievances and overturning old conventions and forms of rule.
To do this, I bring together two distinct but complementary approaches.
First, I draw on a current within Marxist thought that emphasizes fascism’s
contradictory relationship with the capitalist class. As a movement or
a regime, fascism attacks the left and defends class exploitation but
also pursues an agenda that clashes with capitalist interests in important
ways. Since the 1920s, several independent Marxists have analyzed fascism
along these lines; I will look specifically at the work of August Thalheimer,
Tim Mason, Mihaly Vajda, Don Hamerquist, and J. Sakai.
These writers are strong in analyzing fascism’s class politics –-
its relationship with capital and other class forces, its roots in capitalist
crisis, and its impact on the socioeconomic order. They are weaker in
discussing fascist ideology, which is important for positioning fascism
within the political right and for understanding why people -– sometimes
millions of people –- are attracted to fascist movements. To address
these issues, I draw on the work of Roger Griffin, a non-leftist scholar
who has done pathbreaking work on fascist ideology over the past two decades.
Griffin treats fascism as a form of revolutionary nationalism that attacks
both the left and liberal capitalist values, an approach that resonates
strongly with some of the most promising leftist discussions of fascism.
Griffin’s focus on ideology neglects fascism’s structural
dimensions but offers a helpful complement to a class-centered analysis.
The body of this essay is divided into three parts. First, I discuss the
work of several independent Marxists who have grappled with fascism’s
relationship with capitalism, from Thalheimer’s “Bonapartism”
theory to Hamerquist and Sakai’s treatments of fascism as a right-wing
revolutionary movement. Next I explore Griffin’s ideology-centered
approach, particularly his argument that fascism represents a blend of
populist ultranationalism and a myth of collective rebirth. Lastly, I
offer a new draft definition of fascism that incorporates aspects of both
approaches, and discuss how this stereoscopic vision can help us understand
fascist movements and tendencies today.
From Bonapartism to Right-Wing Revolution
Many Marxists have treated fascism as a tool of big business to defend
capitalism in times of crisis. There have been several different versions
of this approach. During the Communist movement’s so-called Third
Period, roughly 1928-1935, leaders of the Communist International (Comintern)
argued that fascism wasn’t really a distinct political movement,
but rather a counterrevolutionary trend within all bourgeois parties.
This meant that the rising Nazi movement in Germany posed no specific
danger. In fact, it was more important for Communists to fight against
the Social Democratic Party (“social fascists”) to win workers
to revolutionary politics. This conception blocked German Communists from
seeking an alliance with Social Democrats against their common Nazi enemy
–- the one thing that could have saved Germany from Nazi rule at
that point.
After Hitler’s rise to power, the Comintern shifted course. In December
1933, the Comintern executive committee declared that “Fascism is
the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic
and most imperialist elements of finance capital.”4 By
identifying fascism with a specific wing of the capitalist class, this
approach soon contributed to a new Popular Front strategy of broad anti-fascist
alliances with Social Democrats and liberal capitalists. In practice,
this meant abandoning revolutionary politics for liberal reformism. Over
the following decades, the Comintern’s 1933 definition was embraced
by radicals of various persuasions and become the most well-known and
influential leftist definition of fascism.
Leon Trotsky, in opposition to the Comintern, emphasized that fascism
developed as an autonomous mass movement, based primarily in the petty
bourgeoisie, whose plebian and violent character frightened big capitalists.
Nevertheless, he argued, fascism’s main purpose was to smash the
workers’ organizations in the service of capitalism. Once in power,
fascism lost its mass support and became “a most ruthless dictatorship
of monopolist capital.”5 Some other leftists have echoed
Trotsky’s distinction between fascism as a movement and fascism
as a regime. For example, Canadian Marxist David Lethbridge endorses the
Comintern definition but acknowledges that fascists initially criticize
big business and sometimes disrupt political stability in ways that the
ruling class does not want. But, he argues, fascism falls into line and
gives up its radicalism “as soon as it becomes financed by substantial
circles within the ruling class.”6
All of these approaches oversimplify fascism’s complex relationship
with capitalism. Certainly, both Italian and German fascists received
crucial support in winning state power from sections of the business community,
the military, and the state apparatus. Once established, the fascist regimes
aided capitalism and boosted profits by suppressing the left, smashing
the labor movement, and -– at first -– stabilizing the economy
and society. Both Mussolini’s and Hitler’s governments initially
included some traditional conservatives as junior members, and old elites
kept control of some sectors, such as the army. The “radical”
wings of the fascist movement that wanted to challenge old elites more
directly were either frustrated, as in Italy, or suppressed, as in Germany.
But as the fascist regimes consolidated themselves, the capitalist class
increasingly lost political control: it lost the power to determine the
main direction of state policy. Fascism installed a new political elite
that advanced its own ideological agenda. While capitalists remained an
important constituent in the overall system of rule, they were progressively
reduced to a reactive role at the level of national policy, adapting themselves
to the fascists' agenda, not the reverse.
An important statement of this view came from British Marxist historian
Timothy Mason, who was a specialist on the working class under Nazism.
In his 1966 essay, “The Primacy of Politics,” Mason argued
that “both the domestic and the foreign policy of the National Socialist
government became, from 1936 onwards, increasingly independent of the
economic ruling classes, and even in some essential respects ran contrary
to their interests.”7
In Mason’s view, the representatives of capital handed state power
to Hitler in the mistaken belief that they would be able to retake it
once the Nazis had crushed the left and restabilized civil society. During
the first few years of Nazi rule, business elites played little role in
shaping foreign or military policy but continued to control economic policy
through Hjalmar Schacht, minister of economics and Reichsbank president.
But starting in 1936, the Nazis intensified rearmament and demanded economic
self-sufficiency for Germany. Leaders of heavy industry, who had previously
dominated the business community and had been among Nazism's staunchest
allies, opposed this shift toward economic isolation because they relied
on international trade. The IG Farben chemical trust gained influence
in their place by promising to provide synthetic replacements for strategic
imports (notably petroleum and rubber), thereby furthering the Nazis’
self-sufficiency goal. The shift not only “broke the economic and
political supremacy of heavy industry,” it also “meant an
end to the formation of any general and unified political will or representation
of interests on the part of German capital...all that was left were the
special interests of individual firms, at most of certain branches of
the economy.”8 Each big firm cultivated its own ties
with state agencies in order to win contracts, but big business lost its
collective voice as a player in shaping overall policy.
Mason acknowledged that capitalists took advantage of the rearmament drive
and the German military victories to expand, increase profits, and smash
foreign competitors. But the overall direction of the Nazi war policy
was based on political aims, not economic ones. The war helped alleviate
certain economic shortages, but those shortages were the direct result
of the forced rearmament drive itself.
In this context, Mason emphasized, the Nazi state pursued ideologically
driven goals -– the genocide and mass enslavement of Jews and other
peoples – that were “in flat contradiction to the interests
of the war economy”:
Among the first Polish Jews who were gassed in the extermination camps
were thousands of skilled metal workers from Polish armament factories....
The army emphasized the irrational nature of this action in view of the
great shortage of skilled labour, but was unable to save the Jewish armament
workers for industry.... The same internal power relationship lay behind
the use of scarce railway installations for the deportation of persecuted
Jews towards the end of the war, instead of for the provisioning of the
forces on the Eastern Front.9
Similarly, the Nazi leadership decided to import millions of enslaved
eastern European workers for the war economy -– rather than draft
German women for industrial work -– even though the official in
charge of labor deployments warned that slave labor was unproductive,
unreliable, and a “racial danger” to the German people.
Mason’s essay has held up well, with some qualifications. Ian Kershaw,
after weighing two decades of later scholarship on the topic, endorsed
the main line of Mason’s argument but cautioned that Mason separated
politics and economics too sharply and exaggerated industrialists’
loss of political influence under Nazi rule. Jane Caplan suggested that
the concept “autonomy” was preferable to “the primacy
of politics,” so as not to imply a hierarchy of politics over economics.10
Mason claimed that the Nazi state's relationship with capitalists was
“unique.” But the dynamic under Italian Fascism was in fact
strikingly similar. Non-leftist historian Franklin Hugh Adler, in one
of the few detailed English-language studies of Italian Fascism’s
relationship with big business, describes how Mussolini’s regime
helped industrialists to intensify workplace exploitation and control
–- both by destroying working-class organizations and by overruling
the Fascist movement’s own syndicalist wing. At the same time, the
Fascist state pursued a long series of policies that industrialists did
not initiate and did not want, from overvaluing the lira’s exchange
rate to imposing a corporatist bureaucracy on the economy, from encouraging
Italians to move to the countryside and have lots of babies to allying
with Hitler against Britain and France. Adler summarizes this dynamic
as follows:
Although absolute managerial authority was preserved at the factory level,
and Confindustria [the confederation of Italian industrialists] came to
assume significant authority in administering economic policy, it is nevertheless
the case that the context of economic policy became increasingly political
and irrational from a strictly economic point of view…. At the level
of public policy, both foreign and domestic, Confindustria exercised little
or no initiative. Here the association, at best, could negotiate subsequent
trade-offs to the relative advantage of industry once fundamental
decisions had already been made; it reacted rather than acted [italics
in original].11
Adler’s discussion suggests that capitalists held onto more political
power under Italian Fascism than they did under German Nazism. But in
both cases they increasingly lost control of core government policy.
Although Mason did not offer any theoretical framework to explain “the
primacy of politics” under Nazism, his analysis meshes closely with
the Bonapartism theory of fascism first proposed by August Thalheimer
in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Thalheimer was a leading theoretician
of the German Communist Party (KPD), who was expelled in 1928 for opposing
the Third Period line and helped form the Communist Party–Opposition
(KPO). Thalheimer rejected the Comintern’s campaign against “social
fascism” and called instead for broad-based working-class defense
against the Nazis through extraparliamentary action.
Thalheimer argued that Marx’s analysis of the Louis Bonaparte dictatorship
in mid-nineteenth-century France offered the best starting point for understanding
fascism. The fascist dictatorship, like that of Louis Bonaparte, represented
“the autonomisation of the executive power,” in which the
capitalist class gave up control of the state in order to protect its
socioeconomic status. Thalheimer quoted a passage from Marx’s The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that described this move:
the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should
be delivered from the danger of its own rule… that in order to preserve
its social power intact, its political power must be broken; that the
individual bourgeois can continue to exploit the other classes and to
enjoy undisturbed property, family, religion and order, only on condition
that their class be condemned along with the other classes to like political
nullity…and the sword that is to safeguard it must at the same time
be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles.12
Like Bonapartism, Thalheimer argued, fascism came to power after “an
unsuccessful proletarian onslaught ended with the demoralization of the
working class, while the bourgeoisie, exhausted, distraught and dispirited,
cast around for a saviour to protect its social power.”13
This interpretation had far more accuracy than the Comintern’s Third
Period line that fascism was capitalism’s last-ditch defense against
the rising threat of proletarian revolution. And while the Comintern claimed
that fascist rule was a natural outgrowth of bourgeois parliamentarianism,
Thalheimer argued that it marked a “sudden leap.” Parliamentary
governments helped lay the groundwork for fascism with their own anti-labor
repression, but fascism itself “only begins at the point when and
where the bayonet becomes independent and turns its point against bourgeois
parliamentarians as well.”14
Thalheimer saw the fascist party, like Louis Bonaparte’s Society
of December 10th, as consisting of “socially uprooted elements from
every class, from the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the urban petty bourgeoisie,
the peasantry, the workers,” while the fascist militia paralleled
the Bonapartist army, “and like it provides a source of livelihood
for the socially uprooted.” Fascist ideology echoed Bonapartism
in its nationalism, rhetorical denunciations of economic and political
elites, and glorification of the heroic leader. But while Bonaparte’s
organization mirrored French working-class secret societies, the fascist
party mirrored the Soviet Communist Party. As a mass formation, the fascist
party was in some ways stronger than Bonaparte's organization, but this
also intensified its internal contradictions “between the social
interests of this mass following and the interests of the dominant classes
which it has to serve.”15
Thalheimer regarded fascism as inherently unstable, a regime pulled simultaneously
in opposite directions. “Fascism, like Bonapartism, seeks to be
the benefactor of all classes; hence it continually plays one class off
against another, and engages in contradictory maneuvers internally.”
He predicted that the conflicting policy demands of fascism’s various
constituencies, “combined with the nationalist imperialist ideology,
push the dictator to external violations of the peace, and finally to
war”– a process that would bring about fascism’s ruin.16
Thalheimer’s discussion amounts to just a skeletal analysis of fascism.
He offered only brief, general comments on fascism’s ideology, organization,
and social base; the dynamics of capitalist-fascist relations; and the
historical context that promoted fascism’s rise. Some have criticized
him for applying the concept of Bonapartism mechanically. But given that
Thalheimer wrote early – only a few years after Mussolini consolidated
his dictatorship and before the Nazi seizure of power -– his outline
matches the fascist regimes’ later trajectories strikingly well.
Thalheimer’s work has influenced a number of later scholars. Jane
Caplan, for example, echoed and reformulated his point about fascism’s
inherent instability:
Fascism is the most extreme form yet observed of the exceptional capitalist
state, and the essential contradiction of exceptional states is that they
represent a type of coercive structure in which the control of the extraction
of surplus value is displaced from the labor process to the political
process, in a vast enhancement of the state's role. The fascist regime
is the extreme form of the autonomization of politics under capitalism.
It is the product of an immense dislocation of the capitalist mode of
production and... is unlikely to persist in the long term, for it manifestly
bristles with contradictions… Under National Socialism, for example,
one term of the fundamental contradiction in the role of the state is
expressed in the tendency toward the ultimate autonomization of the political
police, with its disruptive implications for the process of production.17
Hungarian Marxist philosopher Mihaly Vajda incorporated a Bonapartist
approach into a general theory of fascism in his book Fascism as a Mass
Movement, which was written in 1969-1970 and first published in 1976.
Vajda was a member of the “Budapest School” of intellectuals
around Georg Lukács, whose members became increasingly critical
of orthodox Soviet-style Marxism, particularly after the Warsaw Pact’s
military suppression of the Czechoslovak Spring in 1968. In 1973, Vajda
and several other members of the Budapest School were fired from their
academic posts and expelled from the Hungarian Workers Party (Communist
Party) for their political views.
Vajda drew on both Thalheimer and Mason in arguing that fascism is “a
capitalist form of rule” in which “the bourgeoisie does not
itself exercise political power, and... lacks a voice in the decisions
of those who are ruling politically.”18 As a general
rule, Vajda asserted that “fascism in no way restricted the bourgeoisie’s
economic power within the factory. It did not thwart their economic interests
and even helped them obtain increased satisfaction.” On the other
hand, fascism “creates extraordinary political conditions and replaces
normal bourgeois everyday life with a situation of constant tension, and
the bourgeoisie finds this at least ‘uncomfortable.’”
Beyond that, fascism “openly contradicts the interests of the ruling
class in some cases,” specifically in the conduct of World War II.
Vajda’s account of the dynamics of German Nazi rearmament and war
closely followed Mason’s. On Italy, Vajda wrote, “if Mussolini
had not bound his fate to Hitler’s absolutely, none of his political
objectives would have endangered the bourgeoisie’s particular interests
in any way whatsoever.” But Mussolini’s alliance with Hitler,
like the Nazi war drive itself, reflected fascism’s inherent tendency
toward aggressive expansionism.19
Vajda went beyond a Bonapartist argument to address several other aspects
of fascism, such as its social psychology and the contrasting historical
functions it served in Italy and Germany. As his book’s title suggests,
Vajda emphasized that a fascist regime comes to power as a mass movement,
which gives it both organized popular support and a recruiting pool for
the new political elite. The fascist movement centers on combat organizations
such as the stormtroopers, whose paramilitary activism is the driving
force in fascism’s bid for state power. Although helpful for understanding
the Italian and German examples, this focus on paramilitary formations
arguably does not apply to all fascist movements.
Vajda also argued that fascism has a distinctive ideology: a form of aggressive,
totalistic nationalism. Within the nation-state, this doctrine subordinates
“every kind of particularity to the ‘total,’ ‘natural-organic’
whole, ‘the nation’”; externally, it promotes national
uplift “even at the expense of the very existence of other nations.”
Fascist ideology negates bourgeois democracy and liberalism (which involve
the promotion of particular group interests over the national totality)
and rejects the principle of human equality in favor of national chauvinism
or racism. But fascist ideology does not challenge the principle of private
property; therefore its vision of national unity “is not a negation
of the basis and framework of the existing class society” and “represents
an illusory transcedence of particularity.”20
Vajda argued that “the ‘uplifting’ of the ‘nation’…
is the only constant element in [fascism’s] very varied programmes,
which in other respects are always subject to radical change.” This
nationalism and racism “enabled fascism to avoid conflict between,
on the one hand, the particular interests of the masses who joined it
and were represented by it, and on the other hand, the basic principles
of the existing social system.”21
Vajda’s discussion sheds a useful light on fascist ideology and
prefigures several points in Roger Griffin's more developed treatment.
Vajda’s formulation is not precise enough to distinguish fascist
ideology from other forms of right-wing nationalism and overlooks the
fact that some fascist movements, such as Romania's Iron Guard, were not
expansionist. In addition, as I will argue later, some fascist ideologies
don’t center on nationalism at all.
Thalheimer, Mason, and Vajda wrote about fascism of the 1920s-1940s. The
2002 book Confronting Fascism: Discussion Documents for a Militant Movement
is concerned with fascism today as much as “classical” fascism
-– its points of reference are not just Hitler and Mussolini but
also the World Church of the Creator and Alexander Dugin, Israeli West
Bank settlers and the Taliban. As outlined in the Introduction by Xtn
(then of Chicago Anti-Racist Action), the book grew out of discussions
among anti-fascist and revolutionary leftists (both anarchist and Marxist)
about the relationship between fighting fascism and fighting the capitalist
state. It was published in the wake of the September 11th attacks, which
sparked a new wave of state repression and racist attacks while highlighting
the fact that some of the U.S. power structure's most militant opponents
were on the far right.22
Confronting Fascism centers on an essay by Don Hamerquist, formerly of
the Sojourner Truth Organization, and an extended reply by J. Sakai, a
Maoist best known for his book Settlers: The Mythology of the White Proletariat.
Hamerquist and Sakai are both independent Marxists who have worked with
anarchist anti-fascists and been influenced by anti-authoritarian critiques
of dogmatic Marxism. Like Thalheimer, Mason, and Vajda, they emphasize
that fascism is an independent political force, not a capitalist puppet
or policy. But Hamerquist and Sakai go much further than this, presenting
fascism as a right-wing revolutionary force. In Sakai’s words, “Fascism
is a revolutionary movement of the right against both the bourgeoisie
and the left, of middle class and declassed men, that arises in zones
of protracted crisis.” It is not revolutionary in the socialist
or anarchist sense: “Fascism is revolutionary in a simpler use of
the word. It intends to seize State power for itself... in order to violently
reorder society in a new class rule.”23
Hamerquist and Sakai argue that most leftists seriously underestimate
fascism’s potential to attract mass support within the United States
and worldwide. Capitalism’s developing contradictions, they argue,
create growing opportunities for a resurgence of fascist movements. Far
from being a frozen relic of the past, fascism is a dynamic political
force that includes a range of factions and tendencies and is evolving
in response to changing conditions. Fascist groups feed on popular hostility
to big business and the capitalist state, and some of them present an
oppositional militance that looks more serious and committed than that
of most leftist groups today. (Hamerquist particularly cites “third
position” fascists, who claim to reject both the left and the right,
but the argument is not limited to these groups.) The main danger of fascism
today, Hamerquist argues, is not that it will seize power, but that it
“might gain a mass following among potentially insurgent workers
and declassed strata through an historic default of the left” causing
“massive damage to the potential for a liberatory anti-capitalist
insurgency.”24
A related danger that Hamerquist raises is a convergence between fascists
and sections of the radical left. He points to leftward overtures from
sections of the far right, and tendencies within much of the left that
mesh dangerously with fascism, such as male supremacy, glorification of
violence, leader cultism, hostility to open debate and discussion, and
elitism. Hamerquist notes that German Communists in the early 1930s sometimes
made tactical alliances with the Nazis against the Social Democrats because
they considered Social Democrats the bigger threat.
Hamerquist warns that U.S. fascist groups are actively organizing around
a number of issues that leftists often consider to be “ours,”
such as labor struggles, environmentalism, opposition to police repression,
U.S. imperialism, and corporate globalization. This kind of fascist popular
appeal is nothing new. As Sakai points out, both Mussolini and Hitler
galvanized people largely by attacking established elites and promoting
an anti-bourgeois militance that seemed much more exciting and dynamic
than conventional left politics. “Many youth in 1930s Germany viewed
the Nazis as liberatory. As opposed to the German social-democrats, for
example, who preached the dutiful authority of parents over children,
the Hitler Youth gave rebellious children the power to keep their own
hours, have an active sex and political life, smoke, drink and have groups
of their own.”25
In different ways, both Hamerquist and Sakai argue that fascism’s
radical approach shapes its relationship with capitalism. Of the two writers,
Sakai’s position is closer to a Bonapartist model. He describes
fascism as “anti-bourgeois but not anti-capitalist.” Under
fascist regimes, “capitalism is restabilized but the bourgeoisie
pays the price of temporarily no longer ruling the capitalist State.”
But for Sakai this conflict is much starker than it is for Bonapartism
theorists. Today’s fascism “is opposed to the big imperialist
bourgeoisie… to the transnational corporations and banks, and their
world-spanning ‘multicultural’ bourgeois culture. Fascism
really wants to bring down the World Bank, WTO and NATO, and even America
the Superpower. As in destroy.”26
Sakai argues that fascism radically reshapes the capitalist social order
to create an economy of “heightened parasitism”: “a
lumpen-capitalist economy more focused on criminality, war, looting and
enslavement.” He describes how Hitler’s regime elevated millions
of German workers into a new parasitic class of soldiers, policemen, and
bureaucrats and replaced them with a new proletariat of foreign and slave
laborers, retirees, and women. This process “created an Aryan society
that had never existed before” -– giving Nazi racial categories
a concrete, social reality that was qualitatively new (but which paralleled
the color-line divisions of U.S. society).27
Sakai’s discussion belies claims that Hitler’s regime had
little or no impact on the socioeconomic order. We should remember, however,
that this discussion does not apply to Italian Fascism, which
lacked Nazism’s overarching racialist imperative and never consolidated
the same degree of control over the state. Its effect on the socioeconomic
order was far more limited.
Hamerquist takes fascist anti-capitalism more seriously than Sakai does.
He notes that current-day fascist movements encompass various positions
on how to relate to the capitalist class, from opportunists who want to
cut a deal, to pro-capitalist revolutionaries who want to pressure big
business into accepting fascist rule, to some third positionists who want
to overthrow the economic ruling class entirely. It is unclear how serious
a challenge to capitalist economic power any fascists would mount in practice.
Where it has been tested, fascist anti-capitalism has meant opposition
to “bourgeois values,” specific policies, or a “parasitic”
wing of capital (such as Jewish bankers) -– not the capitalist system.
On the other hand, as Hamerquist warns, it would be dangerous for leftists
to dismiss the prospect of a militantly anti-capitalist fascism simply
because it doesn’t fit our preconceptions.
Hamerquist’s concept of fascist anti-capitalism rests partly on
his analysis (following German left communist Alfred Sohn-Rethel) that
German Nazism foreshadowed “a new ‘transcapitalist’
exploitative social order.” In particular, Hamerquist argues, German
fascism’s genocidal labor policy broke with capitalist principles.
Not just labor power, but workers themselves were “consumed in the
process of production just like raw materials and fixed capital,”
thus obliterating “the distinctively capitalist difference between
labor and other factors of production.” True, “normal”
capitalist development involves genocide “against pre-capitalist
populations and against the social formations that obstruct the creation
of a modern working class.” But by contrast, “the German policy
was the genocidal obliteration of already developed sections of the European
working classes” –- i.e., the importation of colonial-style
mass killing into Europe’s industrial heartland.28
This doesn’t necessarily mean that Nazism was in the process of
overthrowing the capitalist system. The labor policies Hamerquist describes
did not call into question the economic power of big business, and arguably
could not be sustained for more than a brief period. But the very fact
that they were not sustainable may be part of the point. As Hamerquist
reminds us, Marx warned that the contradictions of capitalism might end,
not in socialist revolution, but in “barbarism,” “the
common ruin of the contending classes.” Fascist revolution could
be one version of this scenario.29
Here we should remember Thalheimer’s and Caplan’s point that
the fascist state’s contradictory relationship with the business
class -– defending its economic power but pursuing policies that
eventually conflict with capitalist economic rationality -– is inherently
unstable. In theory, this conflict could be resolved in various ways:
(1) the collapse or overthrow of the fascist regime (as happened in Italy
and Germany), (2) the conversion of fascist rule into a more conventional
pro-capitalist regime, or (3) some kind of fascist overthrow of capitalist
economic power. The last of these alternatives is the hardest to imagine,
but cannot simply be dismissed as impossible or nonsensical. It would
not abolish economic exploitation but would reshape it in fundamental
ways, as Hamerquist suggests in his discussion of Nazi labor policy.
Sakai and Hamerquist also differ on the question of fascism’s class
base. Like many others before him, Sakai links fascism to middle-class
and declassed strata threatened or uprooted by rapid social and economic
change -– historical losers who hate the big capitalists and want
to get back the privilege they used to have. Sakai sees this dynamic in
the Germans who rallied to Hitler during the Depression, the Timothy McVeigh
figures who turn to neonazism as the old U.S. system of white privilege
crumbles, and the Muslim world’s shopkeepers and unemployed college
graduates hit by globalization, who are at the core of the pan-Islamic
right. “To the increasing mass of rootless men fallen or ripped
out of productive classes -– whether it be the peasantry or the
salariat –- [fascism] offers not mere working class jobs but the
vision of payback. Of a land for real men, where they and not the bourgeois
will be the one's [sic] giving orders at gunpoint and living off of others.”30
This discussion is helpful but oversimplified. The dynamics Sakai describes
represent part of fascism’s appeal, and there is evidence that the
middle classes and sections of the unemployed disproportionately supported
fascism in the interwar period. But it would be a serious distortion to
pigeonhole fascism as a movement of historical losers. Pre-World War II
fascism didn’t just attract declining and uprooted middle classes
such as small merchants, but also groups at the core of the new corporate
economy, such as white-collar workers and professionals. The fascist vision
criticizes modern decadence but also embraces many aspects of modernity.
For example, as David Robert argues, Italian Fascism appealed to petty
bourgeois activists as a vehicle for national integration, political reform,
and large-scale industrial development.31
Furthermore, as Goeff Eley has pointed out about German Nazism, the movement’s
dependence on a particular social class is less striking than its ability
“to broaden its social base in several different directions”
–- to construct “a broadly based coalition of the subordinate
classes,” “without precedent in the German political system.”
In contrast to the Social Democrats and Communists, who remained focused
on the industrial working class, the Nazis (and to a lesser extent Italian
Fascists) unified “an otherwise disjointed ensemble of discontents
within a totalizing populist framework.”32
Hamerquist does not directly expand on his warning that militant fascism
could build a mass base among insurgent workers (a possibility that Sakai
questions). Although definitions of “working class” are subject
to debate, several fascist movements in the 1930s seem to have attracted
substantial numbers of workers, such as the Arrow Cross in Hungary and
Father Coughlin’s Social Justice movement in the United States.
In 1930-1933, workers made up about 30 percent of German Nazi Party members
and a majority within the SA (Stormtroopers), the Nazis’ paramilitary
wing.33
While they disagree about fascism’s class base, Hamerquist and Sakai
agree that we need to rethink old leftist assumptions about fascism’s
racial politics. As Hamerquist puts it, “there is no reason to view
fascism as necessarily white just because there are white supremacist
fascists. To the contrary there is every reason to believe that fascist
potentials exist throughout the global capitalist system. African, Asian,
and Latin American fascist organizations can develop that are independent
of, and to some extent competitive with Euro-American ‘white’
fascism.”34 Coupled with this, some white fascists support
Third World anti-imperialism or even disavow racial supremacy, and some
have started to build links with socially conservative Black organizations
such as the Nation of Islam.
Sakai notes that the mass displacement of Black workers over the past
generation, coupled with the defeat of 1960s left Black nationalism, has
fueled an unprecedented growth of authoritarian rightist organizations
in the Black community. Sakai also argues that fascism's key growth area
now is in the Third World, where “pan-Islamic fascism” and
related movements have largely replaced the left as the major anti-imperialist
opposition force.
Unfortunately, Sakai and Hamerquist have little to say about what fascism
means for women, as Xtn notes in the Introduction to Confronting Fascism.
Sakai asserts that fascism is basically a male movement both in composition
and outlook. In reality, as Xtn points out, fascist movements intensify
patriarchy but often rely on mass support from both women and men. As
I have argued elsewhere, all fascist movements are male supremacist, but
they have embodied a range of doctrines on women and gender issues, both
traditionalist and anti-traditionalist, and even including twisted versions
of feminism. Fascism has sometimes recruited large numbers of women as
active participants, largely by offering them specific benefits and opportunities
-– in education, youth groups, athletics, volunteer work, and certain
paid jobs -– even as it sharpened and centralized male dominance.35
Hamerquist and Sakai offer a fuller, livelier picture of fascism than
the earlier writers we have considered. In my view, their discussion of
current-day movements highlights the immediacy of the issue, and their
emphasis on fascist radicalism helps to explain fascism’s appeal
much more than Bonapartism theory does. At the same time, they are not
always clear about which movements they consider fascist (and why) or
about fascism’s relationship to other right-wing forces. Their discussions
of fascist ideology are fragmentary and sometimes vague. For a fuller
and more systematic look at these areas, I turn now to someone outside
the Marxist tradition.
The Myth of National Rebirth
British historian Roger Griffin has been a leading figure in the academic
field of fascist studies since publishing The Nature of Fascism in 1991.
In this and later works, Griffin draws on a wide body of historical material
to develop an innovative theory of fascism. He is a self-described liberal
whose premises, focus, and method contrast sharply with the Marxist writers
I discussed above. This makes the complementarity of their analyses all
the more striking.
Griffin’s approach builds on the work of historian George Mosse,
whom he credits with “establishing several points which herald a
new phase in fascist studies”:
First, though Nazism is to be conceived as unquestionably a manifestation
of generic fascism, it is no longer to be seen as paradigmatic or its
quintessential manifestation. Second, at bottom fascism is neither a regime,
nor a movement, but first and foremost an ideology, a critique of the
present state of society and a vision of what is to replace it. Third,
when this vision is dissected it reveals fascism to be a revolutionary
form of nationalism…Fourth, its ideology expresses itself primarily
not through theory and doctrines, but through a bizarre synthesis of ideas
whose precise content will vary significantly from nation to nation but
whose appeal will always be essentially mythic rather than rational. Equally
importantly, it is an ideology which expresses itself through a liturgical,
ritualized form of mass political spectacle.36
Like Mosse (but unlike many leftists), Griffin takes seriously fascists’
own statements of belief. He argues that an analysis of fascist ideology
–- like socialist, liberal, or conservative ideology –- should
be based on how its proponents themselves articulate a social critique
and vision, an approach he calls “methodological empathy.”37
Although some critics wrongly interpret this as lack of critical distance
or even political sympathy for fascism, methodological empathy is in fact
crucial for understanding what draws people to support fascist movements.
Another basic premise of Griffin’s work is that “generic”
fascism (as opposed to the specific Fascism headed by Mussolini) represents
an “ideal type,” a term coined by Max Weber. This means it
is a theoretical construct that can only approximate historical phenomena.
Definitions of fascism, Griffin argues, are not objectively “true”
in the descriptive sense –- rather, they are more or less useful
as conceptual frameworks for interpreting and classifying events and mapping
relationships. For some reason, historian Robert Paxton claims that this
approach “condemn[s] us to a static view, and to a perspective that
encourages looking at fascism in isolation.” As I will show, Griffin’s
own work belies both of these criticisms.38
Griffin’s definition of fascism can be boiled down to three words:
“palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism.”39 Each
of these terms needs explanation:
Palingenetic: From the Greek palin (again or anew) +
genesis (creation or birth). It refers to a myth or vision of collective
rebirth after a period of crisis or decline.
Populist: A form of politics that draws its claims of
legitimacy from “the people” (as opposed, for example, to
a monarchical dynasty or divine appointment) and uses mass mobilization
to win power and transform society.
Ultra-nationalism: It treats the nation as a higher,
organic unity to which all other loyalites must be subordinated. Ultra-nationalism
rejects “anything compatible with liberal institutions or with the
tradition of Enlightenment humanism which underpins them.”40
As a form of populist ultra-nationalism, fascism fundamentally rejects
the liberal principles of pluralism and individual rights, as well as
the socialist principles of class-based solidarity and internationalism,
all of which threaten the nation's organic unity. At the same time, fascism
rejects traditional bases for authority, such as the monarchy or nobility,
in favor of charismatic politics and a new, self-appointed political elite
that claims to embody the people’s will. Fascism seeks to build
a mass movement of everyone considered part of the national community,
actively engaged but controlled from above, to seize political power and
remake the social order. This movement is driven by a vision “of
the national community rising phoenix-like after a period of encroaching
decadence which all but destroyed it.”41 Such rebirth
involves systematic, top-down transformation of all social spheres by
an authoritarian state, and suppression or purging of all forces, ideologies,
and social groups the fascists define as alien.
By demanding a sweeping cultural and political transformation and break
with the established order, the vision of renewal sets fascism apart from
conservative forms of ultra-nationalism as a revolutionary ideology. The
fascist revolution, Griffin argues, is above all a cultural one. “The
dominant world-view...was for the fascist mindset the primary reality,
the principal locus of the nation’s rebirth, and the foremost object
of its regeneration and metamorphosis. Indeed, the Marxist stress on socio-economics
as the motor of historical change was for fascists a symptom of its essential
materialism, its ‘atheism,’ and hence of its decadence.”
“In the new order ‘culture’ would cease to be an individualized,
privatized, marginalized sphere of modern life…Instead it would
once more be what Lewis Mumford calls the ‘megamachine,’ the
matrix for all the mythopoiea, rituals, institutions, values, and artistic
creativity of an entire society…”42
Despite this emphasis on the subjective, Griffin argues, fascism also
pursues major objective structural changes. “While neither the Fascist
nor Nazi state wanted to abolish capitalist economics and private property,
they had no scruples about involving themselves with the economy on a
scale unprecedented in any liberal state except in wartime,” including
vast public works programs, a drive for economic self-sufficiency (autarky)
and, in the Nazi case, creating a vast empire and enslaving millions of
workers. “Both regimes also indulged in a massive programme of social
engineering which involved creating mass organizations for every social
grouping, retooling the educational system, symbolically appropriating
all aspects of leisure, sport, culture, and technology…”431
In emphasizing fascism's revolutionary side, Griffin obscures the extent
to which fascism has acted as a bulwark of capitalism and established
social hierarchy. He notes in passing that “fascism in practice
colluded with traditional ruling elites in order to gain and retain power
and left capitalist structures substantially intact.” But for him
the crucial point is that “at the level of ideological intent both
Fascism and Nazism aimed to coordinate all the energies of the nation,
including conservative and capitalist ones, in a radically new type of
society... and went some way towards doing this.”44 Griffin
offers no indication that the tension between these two statements needs
to be addressed at a basic theoretical level -– for him, ideology
is simply more important.
Nevertheless, Griffin’s focus on fascism's myth of collective rebirth
represents a conceptual breakthrough, which has widely influenced the
field of fascism studies. The palingenetic element gives Griffin’s
model of fascism more precision than some earlier ones (such as Mihaly
Vajda’s), which identify fascist ideology simply with ultra- or
“organic’ nationalism. The focus on palingenetic myth also
clarifies fascism’s apparent contradiction between forward- and
backward-looking tendencies. As Griffin notes, although some forms of
fascism invoke the glories of an earlier age, they do so as inspiration
for creating a “new order,” not restoring an old one. Fascism
“thus represents an alternative modernism rather than a rejection
of it.”45
The concept of palingenetic myth sheds light not only on fascism, but
also on a number of related political currents. For example, the Ku Klux
Klan was formed in the late 1860s around a vision of restoring the white
supremacist South after its near destruction in the Civil War and Reconstruction.
Since the 1860s, white supremacists have repeatedly invoked this vision
of rebirth to help them interpret and address other crises in the U.S.
racial order. That helps to explain why the Klan, unlike many other racist
institutions, has been revived again and again -– and how the Klan
helped to prepare the ground for fascist ideas imported from Europe.
Griffin’s definition of fascism has other advantages. It is flexible
enough to encompass many different versions of fascist politics. As Griffin
notes, fascism may or may not involve paramilitary organization, a cult
of the supreme leader, corporatist economic policies, or a drive for imperialist
expansion. (Some fascist movements, such as Oswald Mosley’s British
Union of Fascists, have preached neutralism or even a community of regenerated
nations.) And while all forms of fascism are racist, Griffin argues, in
the sense that they promote ethnic chauvinism and mono-cultural societies,
this racial ideology may or may not be defined in biological terms and
can range from relatively mild ethnocentrism all the way to systematic
programs for genocide.
Unlike many definitions of fascism, Griffin’s model is also specific
enough to map fine-grained distinctions and relationships between fascism
and other branches of the right. Griffin distinguishes fascism from formations
that share a related ideology but make no effort to build a mass base
or to overthrow a liberal political system. He recognizes that there can
be borderline cases. He argues, notably, that Italy’s National Alliance,
successor to the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, represents a contradictory
but genuine hybrid between fascist ideology and an acceptance of the liberal
democratic rules of the game. Griffin’s name for this hybrid, “democratic
fascism,” is unfortunate, but the basic point holds true that some
formations straddle the line between revolutionary and reformist branches
of the right.46
Griffin’s definition of fascism also excludes most of the dictatorships
that have often been labeled fascist. He has suggested the term para-fascist
to describe many of these.47 A para-fascist regime is imposed
from above (often by the military) and represents traditional elites trying
to preserve the old order, but surrounds its conservative core with fascist
trappings. These trappings may include an official state party, paramilitary
organizations, a leader cult, mass political ritual, corporatism, and
the rhetoric of ultranationalist regeneration. Para-fascist regimes may
be just as ruthless as genuine fascist ones in their use of state terrorism.
Unlike true fascism, para-fascism does not represent a genuine populist
mobilization and does not substantively challenge established institutions.
During the 1920s and 1930s, Griffin argues, para-fascist regimes arose
in several European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Romania,
and Austria, joined by the Vichy government after France surrendered to
Germany in 1940. Para-fascist regimes regarded genuine fascist movements
as a threat and used various strategies to contain, coopt, or crush them.
In Spain during the Civil War, for example, General Franco “imposed
a shot-gun marriage between Falangists and the traditional (that is non-fascist)
radical right” as part of his strategy to establish a para-fascist
dictatorship.48
Contrary to claims that an “ideal type” definition freezes
our image of fascism in the past, Griffin is also alert to ways that fascism
has changed. He writes in some detail about neo-fascism, by which he means
post-1945 forms of fascism that have substantially modified or replaced
inter-war versions of fascist ideology.49 Many fascists have
concealed their politics behind a democratic façade through the
use of coded rhetoric, helping to blur the line between hardline conservatism
and the far right. Some have advanced new philosophical systems for rationalizing
fascist politics, such as the Nouvelle Droit (New Right) of Alain Benoist's
GRECE think-tank in France or the Traditionalism of Julius Evola in Italy.
Third Position groups have embraced the “leftist” anti-capitalist
current on the margins of traditional fascism, rather than the mainstream
of Hitler or Mussolini.
Among a range of neo-fascist innovations, Griffin highlights one trend
in particular: a shift toward increased internationalism. From the 1960s
on, international networking increased substantially, both through informal
contacts and through organizations such as CEDADE (Spanish Circle of Friends
of Europe), the NSDAP-AO (National Socialist German Workers Party-Overseas
Organization), and WUNS (World Union of National Socialists). Such networking
has fostered the sense of belonging to an international movement, and
a belief that fascist principles can regenerate many nations, not just
one’s own.
Despite the many advantages of Griffin’s approach, several assumptions
sharply limit its usefulness for understanding current politics. This
is evident, for example, when Griffin addresses the social and political
factors that promote fascism’s rise. He argues that the growth of
a strong fascist movement is only possible under a special combination
of circumstances: a liberal democracy (where there is political space
for fascist organizing) experiencing a major crisis (which gives visions
of radical rebirth broad appeal) and without strong non-fascist right-wing
forces (which block fascism’s ability to build mass support). For
a fascist seizure of political power, the window of opportunity is even
narrower: the liberal democracy must be “mature enough institutionally
to preclude the threat of a direct military or monarchical coup, yet too
immature to be able to rely on a substantial consensus in the general
population” around liberal values. Griffin argues that fascist movements
have reached such an opportunity in only four countries: Italy (1918-22),
Germany (1918-23, 1929-33), Finland (1929-32), and South Africa (1939-43).50
Unlike his definition of fascism, this part of Griffin’s discussion
is too static, trapped in a description of classical fascism’s rise
between the world wars. As the history of the left shows, oppositional
forces can organize on a mass scale (and even take power) under many different
political systems, not just liberal democracies. Even weaker is Griffin’s
claim that fascists will never again be able to break out of their marginal
status to bid for state power, because “the structural factors that
turned Fascism and Nazism into successful revolutions have simply disappeared.”51
As support for this, Griffin argues that since 1945 liberal nation-states
have raised living standards, strengthened popular commitment to democratic
principles, and improved the handling of structural crises. The naiveté
and shortsightedness of these assertions is jarring, given Griffin’s
level of insight on other points. Here Griffin seems particularly limited
by his liberalism and lack of radical analysis.
Another weak spot in Griffin’s discussion concerns fascism’s
relationship with religion. He argues that fascism is a secular ideology
that is fundamentally incompatible with “genuine” religion.
To Griffin, fascism’s “earthly aspirations” contrast
with religion's focus on an infinite, metaphysical reality above all human
activity, and fascism’s brutality and ethnocentrism are irreconcilable
with “authentic” religion's recognition of the interconnectedness
and beauty of all life. It’s true, Griffin admits, that many ostensibly
religious people have embraced fascism, but this represents a “confusion”
of their faith. Yes, many fascist ideologies have incorporated religious
themes, but in doing so fascism has “corrupted,” “desecrated,”
even “mongrelized” religion.52
Given the history of religion worldwide, it’s hard to understand
how Griffin could argue that violent or oppressive versions of religious
belief are simply not authentic. Who is he to say that his concept of
religion is the only true one? In doing so, Griffin is throwing his own
commitment to methodological empathy out the window. If analysis of fascist
ideology is supposed to “penetrate fascist self-understanding...
in order to grasp how people saw the movement,”53 then
we need to try to understand what religion has meant to fascists –-
not dismiss their beliefs as phony or corrupt because they don't match
an external yardstick. Griffin is clear about this when it comes to fascist
conceptions of revolution, but for him religion is a blindspot.
More defensible, but still flawed, is Griffin’s insistence that
there is a basic conceptual difference between fascism and religious “fundamentalism.”
Although both promote a vision of collective rebirth out of a corrupt
and disintegrated modern society, he argues, fascism calls for the rebirth
of a particular nation and claims “the people” –- defined
by a specific cultural or genetic heritage –- as its source of authority.
By contrast, “fundamentalists conceive ‘the people’
as a community of believers created by a divine force for a metaphysical
mission” and define God –- not the nation or race –-
as the ultimate reality and source of legitimacy. Furthermore, fundamentalism
“attempts to reestablish what it conceives to be traditional or
orthodox religious values based on divine revelation,” which means
that its response to the modern world is “not revolutionary but
reactionary and conservative.”54
Griffin concedes that, in practice, “hybrids” between fascism
and fundamentalism can occur, and even that “the boundaries between
the religious right and neo-fascism have become increasingly fuzzy over
the last two decades.”55 His discussion of this point
is somewhat confused, because he uses the term fundamentalism in different
ways, not all of which match his description of fundamentalism quoted
above. In general, the examples he gives of fascist-fundamentalist hybrids
(Kahanism in Israel, the Bharatiya Janata Party in India, Christian Identity
in the United States) are movements that are not particularly concerned
with religious orthodoxy but rather use religion as a marker for national
or ethnic identity and persecution. As Nikki Keddie has argued, such movements
are better described as religious nationalist, and the term fundamentalist
is better reserved for movements (such as the Christian Right) that try
to impose a specific set of religious beliefs or practices on society.56
Fundamentalist movements in Keddie’s narrower sense have relatively
little overlap with fascism as Griffin defines it.
Contrary to Griffin, there are good reasons to extend the concept of fascism
to include some religious fundamentalist movements (in the narrower sense).
This means rethinking the idea that fascism is always a form of nationalism.
In the era of globalization, fascism is less closely tied to nationhood
than it was seventy-five years ago. Griffin himself notes a trend toward
internationalism among neo-fascists, and some neo-fascists have also worked
to break up nation-states into smaller, ethnically pure units (such as
the neonazi call for an independent white homeland in the Pacific Northwest).
A British Third Positionist magazine declares, “Highly centralized
states are likely to lead to extreme conflict in these times. The practical
alternative of decentralized states based on homogeneous groupings co-operating
through Confederacies and allowing bi-lateral agreements between Regions
is the only long-term answer.”57 (Such decentralist visions
remain totalitarian in that they seek to impose rigid ideological conformity
on all spheres of society, but would enforce this through local, regional,
or nongovernmental institutions, not nation-states.)
In the context of these shifts away from traditional fascist nationalism,
the difference between rebirth of a nation and rebirth of a community
of believers remains important, but it isn’t more important than
the difference between Mussolini’s cultural chauvinism and Hitler's
biological racism.
Coupled with this, I disagree with Griffin’s claim that the drive
to impose religious orthodoxy is never revolutionary. The most radical
branches of both the Christian Right and the Islamic Right demand a “return”
to supposedly ancient scriptural laws. But adapted to modern conditions
and combined with modern technology and organizational strategies, this
means a coordinated, elite-controlled project to reshape all social spheres,
which closely resembles the fascist cultural revolution Griffin describes.
It also means that some religious fundamentalists pursue ideological goals
that may clash with capitalist policies (such as promoting consumerism
or exploiting women's labor power) in ways that parallel secular fascism's
contradictory relationship with business elites.
Combining Two Approaches
In their analyses of fascism, Griffin and the independent Marxists I discussed
above share several important points. In broad terms, both regard fascism
as an autonomous political force, a distinct form of right-wing politics
that opposes the left but also challenges the established order, including
conventional capitalist politics and culture. Two of the Marxists (Hamerquist
and Sakai) join with Griffin in labeling fascism as revolutionary. Within
both approaches there is also a recognition that fascism is not a static
entity, but one that evolves to address new historical conditions and
opportunities. Along with these points of commonality, each side also
brings something to the table that the other lacks. Griffin brings an
incisive and detailed portrait of fascist ideology, while the Marxists
bring a careful assessment of fascism’s contradictory relationship
with capitalism.
All of this offers a lot of room for useful interchange, but little work
has been done in this area. Griffin himself often treats Marxist discussions
of fascism as an intellectual dead end, trapped by a supposed dismissal
of fascism’s revolutionary claims and what he calls “the axiomatic
assumption that fascism is primarily to be understood in relation to the
crisis of the capitalist state.”58 However, Griffin does
recognize significant variation among Marxist analyses and in one 2001
essay hails “the prospects for synergy between Marxist and liberal”
approaches to fascist aesthetics.59
On the other side, few Marxists have even addressed Griffin’s work.
Trotskyist Dave Renton offers a mean-spirited polemic that falsifies many
of Griffin’s views. Renton claims, for example, that Griffin wants
to “rescue fascist Italy from stigma” and that he believes
“fascism cannot be blamed for the Holocaust.” In contrast,
Mark Neocleous makes a serious effort to synthesize class analysis with
an exploration of fascist ideology that is partly influenced by Griffin.
But Neocleous underplays fascism’s insurgent dimension -–
precisely the area that should be central to such an interchange -–
and instead portrays fascism one-sidedly as “a counter-revolutionary
phenomenon in defense of capitalism.”60
As a step toward bringing the two approaches together, I offer the following
draft definition: Fascism is a revolutionary form of right-wing populism,
inspired by a totalitarian vision of collective rebirth, that challenges
capitalist political and cultural power while promoting economic and social
hierarchy.61
In this definition, revolutionary implies an effort to bring
about a fundamental, structural transformation of the political, cultural,
economic, or social order. Fascism seeks, first of all, to overthrow established
political elites and abolish established forms of political rule, whether
liberal-pluralist or authoritarian. Second, fascists also attack “bourgeois”
cultural patterns such as individualism and consumerism and aim to systematically
reshape all cultural spheres –- encompassing education, family life,
religion, the media, arts, sports and leisure, as well as the culture
of business and the workplace –- to reflect one unified ideology.
Third, some (not all) forms of fascism promote a socioeconomic revolution
that transforms but does not abolish class society -– as when German
Nazism restructured the industrial heart of Europe with a system of exploitation
based largely on plunder, slave labor, and genocidally working people
to death.
By right-wing I mean a political orientation that reinforces
or intensifies social oppression as part of a backlash against movements
for greater equality, freedom, or inclusiveness. Populism means
a form of politics that uses mass mobilization to rally “the people”
around some form of anti-elitism. (This definition, borrowed from Margaret
Canovan, differs slightly from Griffin's use of the term populism.) Combining
these two concepts, right-wing populism mobilizes a mass movement
around a twisted anti-elitism (often based on conspiracy theories) at
the same time that it intensifies oppression. In place of leftist conceptions
of class struggle, fascists often draw a phony distinction between “producers”
(including “productive” capitalists, workers, and middle classes)
and “parasites” (defined variously as financiers, bureaucrats,
foreign corporations, Jews, immigrants, welfare mothers, etc.). Right-wing
populism appeals largely to middle groups in the social hierarchy, who
have historically formed an important part of fascism's mass base.62
The phrase totalitarian vision of collective rebirth draws on
Griffin's work but broadens his category of ultra-nationalism to encompass
certain religious-based and other non-nationalist movements. The fascist
vision is totalitarian in that it (a) celebrates one group -–
national, ethnic, religious, or racial -– as an organic community
to which all other loyalties must be subordinated, (b) uses mass organizations
and rituals to create a sense of participation and direct identification
with that community, (c) advocates coordinated top-down control over all
institutions, and (d) rejects in principle the concepts of individual
rights, pluralism, equality, and democratic decision-making. The collective
rebirth aspect of the vision declares that the community must be
rescued from a profound inner crisis, largely by purging “alien”
ideologies and groups of people that are considered threats to the community's
unity and vitality. This vision often draws on romanticized images of
the past but points toward a radically new cultural and political order.
Fascist regimes challenge capitalist political and cultural power
by taking dominance of the state away from the representatives of big
business and subordinating capitalist interests to their own ideological
agenda. At the same time, fascism promotes economic and social hierarchy,
either within or (potentially) outside a capitalist framework. Historically,
fascists have colluded with capitalists and bolstered the economic power
of big business. Although fascists have often targeted specific capitalist
features and even specific sectors of the business class, no fascist movement
has substantively attacked core capitalist structures such as private
property and the market economy. A fascist revolution of the future might
radically reshape economic exploitation but would not abolish it.
By combining insights from the two approaches I have explored, the proposed
definition -– with its twin focus on ideology and class rule -–
offers a fuller, more rounded model of fascism. In the process, it gives
us a more powerful tool to map divisions, relationships, and changes in
right-wing politics, and to understand how these dynamics relate to changes
in capitalism.
The past thirty years have seen an upsurge of right-wing movements in
many parts of the world. Many of these movements promote some form of
authoritarian populism –- either nationalist or religious in focus
-– that incorporates themes of anti-elitism and collective regeneration
out of crisis. In this context, some commentators treat explicit racism
or antisemitism as the decisive markers of fascism, but racism and antisemitism
can be found among non-fascists as well, and not all fascists today fit
the classic profile for ethnic bigotry. A more critical dividing line
is between “reformists” who are content to work within existing
channels and “revolutionaries” (including but not limited
to fascists) who advocate a radical break with the established order.
This division often cuts across movements rather than between them. The
United States has seen two major examples of this in recent years: the
Patriot movement and the Christian right.63
The Patriot movement, which included armed “citizens militias”
and peaked in the mid/late 1990s, represented the United States’
first large-scale coalition of committed nazis and non-fascist activists
since World War II. The Patriot movement promoted the apocalyptic specter
of an elite conspiracy to destroy U.S. sovereignty and impose a tyrannical
collectivist system run by the United Nations. The movement’s program
centered on forming armed “militias” to defend against the
expected crackdown, but more extreme proposals circulated widely, such
as bogus “constitutional” theories that would re-legalize
slavery, abolish women’s right to vote, and give people of color
an inferior citizenship status. A loose-knit and unstable network mainly
based among rural, working-class whites, the Patriot movement attracted
millions of supporters at its height. It fed not only on fears of government
repression but also on reactions to economic hardship connected with globalization
(such as the farm crisis of the 1980s), the erosion of traditional white
male privilege, the decline of U.S. global dominance, and disillusionment
with mainstream political options. (Many of the same impulses fueled grassroots
support for Pat Buchanan’s 1992 and 1996 Republican presidential
campaigns. Buchanan blended attacks on immigrants, homosexuals, and feminists
with a critique of corporate globalization and an anti-interventionist
foreign policy, but did not challenge the established political framework.)
The Christian Right has promoted a program of cultural traditionalism
in response to perceived social breakdown and a supposed elite secular
humanist conspiracy to destroy American freedom. The movement’s
agenda centers on reasserting traditional gender roles and heterosexual
male dominance, but also includes strong subthemes of cultural racism.
The Christian right is based mainly among middle-class Sunbelt suburbanites
and has fostered a dense network of local, regional, and national organizations
that actively engage millions of people. The movement includes a small
fascist wing, spearheaded by advocates of Christian Reconstructionism.
Reconstructionists, who have played a key role in the most terroristic
branch of the anti-abortion movement, reject pluralist institutions in
favor of a full-scale theocracy based on their interpretation of biblical
law. However, the bulk of the Christian Right has (so far) advocated more
limited forms of Christian control and has worked to gain power within
the existing political system, not overthrow it.
In many other parts of the world, too, fascism operates as a tendency
or a distinct faction within a larger movement. In western and central
Europe, many right-wing nationalist movements encompass small hardcore
neofascist groups alongside mass parties such as the National Front (France),
the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), and the National Alliance (Italy).64
All three of these parties were built largely by (ex?)-fascists and promote
political themes (especially anti-immigrant racism) that are widely identified
as the opening wedge for a fascist agenda. Both the FPO and the National
Alliance have participated in coalition governments at the national level.
This may be part of a longterm strategy to “fascisticize”
the political climate and institutions from within, but it also suggests
the possibility that fascists -– like socialists –- can be
coopted into a liberal capitalist political system.
The Islamic right encompasses a great diversity of organizations, political
philosophies, strategies, and constituencies across the Muslim world.65
Although some branches (notably Saudi Arabia's religious power structure)
are conservative or reactionary, others represent a kind of right-wing
populism that aims not to reject modernity but reshape it. These branches
use modern forms of political mobilization to rally Muslims against western
imperialism, Zionism, global capitalist culture, and/or local elites.
They envision a collective religious and national (or international) rebirth
through re-Islamicizing society or throwing off foreign domination.
Within this framework, Afghanistan’s Taliban and Lebanon’s
Hezbollah represent opposite poles. The Taliban have promoted a totalitarian
form of Islamic rule that combines virulent misogyny, Pashtun ethnic chauvinism,
and warlord capitalism -– politics that fully deserve the fascist
label. Hezbollah, in contrast, offsets its call for a theocracy modeled
on Iran with an everyday practice that respects religious, ethnic, and
political diversity, does not impose special strictures on women, and
focuses its populist critique mainly on the realities of Israeli aggression
and the hardships faced by Lebanon's Shiite majority.66 (Iran's
Islamic Republic falls somewhere between these two poles. Although authoritarian,
it preserves too much openness and pluralism to be labeled fascist, which
highlights the fact that right-wing revolutionary anti-imperialism does
not necessarily equal fascism.)
India’s massive Hindu nationalist movement advocates Hindu unity
and supremacy as the key to revitalizing India as a nation. The movement
promotes hatred of –- and mass violence against -– Muslims
and claims that India's political leaders have long pursued anti-Hindu
policies and favoritism toward Muslims and other minorities. Hindu nationalism,
or “Hindutva,” has disproportionately appealed to upper-caste,
middle-class Hindus from northern and west-central India. The movement
centers on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Association of National Volunteers,
or RSS), an all-male cadre organization that promotes a paramilitary ethos
and a radical vision to reshape Indian culture along authoritarian corporatist
lines. The RSS’s political spinoff, the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian
People’s Party, or BJP), has often favored a more pragmatic electoral
strategy that blends a toned-down version of Hindu chauvinism with populist
economic appeals. (The BJP headed India’s coalition government from
1998 to 2004 and now leads the parliamentary opposition.) There are also
tensions within the movement between advocates of free trade and economic
nationalists who warn of the dangers posed by foreign investment. In contrast
to many fascists and other right-wing nationalists, Hindutva forces have
sought close strategic ties with both the United States and Israel, especially
since George W. Bush proclaimed the War on Terror.67
This array of movements looks different from classical fascism, in large
part, because the capitalist world has changed. Classical fascism took
shape in an era of European industrialization and nation-building, competing
colonial empires, and an international Communist movement inspired by
the recent Bolshevik Revolution. Now both old-style colonialism and state
socialism have almost vanished, while corporate globalization is shifting
industries across the world and reshaping nation-states. Far-right movements
are responding to these changes in various ways. They promote nostalgia
for old empires but also right-wing anti-imperialism, old-style nationalisms
but also internationalist and decentralized versions of authoritarian
politics. They tap into a backlash against the left but also grow where
the left's weakness has opened space for other kinds of insurgent movements.
And they promote different versions of anti-elitism, often targeting U.S.
or multinational capital but sometimes focusing more on local elites.
Many commentators have argued that fascist movements today represent a
right-wing backlash against capitalist globalization. Martin A. Lee argues,
for example, that in Europe “the waning power of the nation-state
has triggered a harsh ultranationalist reaction.” Here far rightists
have exploited a range of popular issues associated with international
economic restructuring -– not only scapegoating immigrants but also
criticizing the European Union, the introduction of a single European
currency, and the rise of a globalized culture. “Global commerce
acts as the great homogenizer, blurring indigenous differences and smothering
contrasting ethnic traits. Consequently, many Europeans are fearful of
losing not only their jobs, but their cultural and national identities.”68
In Europe and elsewhere, far-right politics is indeed largely a response
to capitalist globalization, but this response is more complex than a
simple backlash. For example, the Patriot/militia movement in the United
States denounced “global elites,” the “new world order,”
the United Nations, international bankers, etc. But their attack on government
regulation, as People Against Racist Terror has pointed out, dovetailed
with “the actual globalist strategy of the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank to end all environmental and labor codes that restrict
untrammeled exploitation.” In India, Hindu nationalists have denounced
multinational capital and globalized culture, but the movement's dominant
approach has been to seek a stronger role for India within the context
of global capitalism. The BJP-led coalition government of 1998-2004 promoted
privatization, deregulation, foreign investment, consumer credit growth,
and expansion of the information technology sector. These policies are
tailored to India’s rising upper and middle classes, eager to participate
more effectively in the global economy -– not historical “losers”
trying to gain back their old status by attacking the forces of change.70
The gender politics of the Christian and Islamic right, too, are sometimes
seen as a reaction against capitalist globalization –- a drive to
force women out of the wage labor force and back into full domestic submission,
depriving multinational capital of a crucial source of labor. There is
truth to this, but here again the dynamic is more complex than a simple
backlash. To begin with, many Christian rightists and Islamic rightists
consider it acceptable for women to work outside the home, as long as
they do it in a way that is “modest” and doesn’t challenge
male authority. As Maria Mies argues in Patriarchy and Accumulation
on a World Scale, however, defining homemaking as women’s natural
role trivializes women’s paid work as a source of “supplementary”
income (which justifies paying women much less than men) and isolates
women workers from each other and from male workers (which hinders collective
labor activism).71 This means that there is potential for both
conflict and accommodation on gender politics between religious rightists
and global (or local) capital.
Concluding note
This essay is intended to challenge the prevailing view among U.S. leftist
organizations that fascism equals a tool of capitalist repression -–
because that view not only distorts history but also hides major political
threats in today’s world. Fascism is better understood as an autonomous
right-wing force that has a contradictory relationship with capital and
that draws mass support largely by advocating a revolution against established
values and institutions. Several Marxists discussed above have helped
to develop this counter-model of fascism, but their work is limited by
an unsystematic analysis of fascist ideology. By contrast, Roger Griffin’s
analysis of fascism centers on a careful treatment of ideology, although
his conception neglects class dynamics and does not adequately address
fascism’s scope and prospects today. Combining the two approaches
gives us a stronger model of fascism than either approach can offer on
its own.
This essay does not offer a comprehensive theory of fascism. Many important
aspects of fascism merit a fuller treatment than I have been able to give
here, and the writers I have discussed are only a sampling of those (both
Marxist and non-Marxist) who have written insightfully about fascism.
I hope that this discussion will encourage further efforts at synthesis.
The concept of fascism as a right-wing revolutionary force has spawned
the idea that we are facing a “three-way fight” between fascism,
conventional global capitalism, and (at least potentially) leftist revolution.
This approach is an improvement over widespread dualistic models that
try to divide all political players between the “forces of oppression”
and the “forces of liberation.” As some radical anti-fascists
have pointed out for years, “my enemy’s enemy” is not
necessarily my friend. At the same time, like any theoretical model, the
three-way fight itself only approximates reality. There are more than
three sides in the struggle, and to understand the different forces and
their interrelationships, we have a lot of work to do.
Notes
*Thanks to Dan Berger, Chip Berlet, Roger Griffin, Don Hamerquist, Karl
Kersplebedeb, Jonathan Scott, Victor Wallis, and Xtn for critical comments
and suggestions.
1.
Matthew N. Lyons, “Is the Bush Administration Fascist?” New
Politics 11, no. 2 (Winter 2007), www.wpunj.edu/newpol/issue42/Lyons42.htm.
2. See for example, Gus Hall, “The hidden GOP agenda: Right-wing
control of Republican Party stands as a wake-up call to the nation,”
People’s Weekly World, 24 August 1996, www.pww.org/archives96/96-08-24-1.html;
Jack Barnes, “Fascism: not a form of capitalism but a way to maintain
capitalist rule,” The Militant, 4 September 2006, www.themilitant.com/2006/7033/703356.html;
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, “The Battle For the Future Will
Be Fought From Here Forward!” (December 2004), http://rwor.org/future/web.htm;
Eric Hass, The Reactionary Right: Incipient Fascism (New York
Labor News: 1963; online edited edition 2007), www.socialistlaborparty.org/pdf/others/reactionary_right.pdf;
Anis Shivani, “Is America Becoming Fascist?” CounterPunch,
26 October 2002, http://www.counterpunch.org/shivani1026.html;
Alan Nasser, “The Threat of U.S. Fascism: An Historical Precedent,”
Common Dreams, 2 August 2007, www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/08/02/2933/;
and the numerous progressive websites that invoke Laurence Britt’s
“Fourteen Identifying Characteristics of Fascism” or Bertram
Gross’s 1980 book Friendly Fascism.
3. Gregory Meyerson and Michael Joseph Roberto, “It Could Happen
Here” (October 2006), www.monthlyreview.org/1006meyerson.htm.
4. Extract from 13th Enlarged Executive of the Communist International
(ECCI) Plenum (held in December 1933) on “Fascism, the War Danger,
and the Tasks of the Communist Parties,” reprinted in International
Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus, ed. Roger Griffin
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 59.
5. Leon Trotsky, “What is National Socialism?” 1933, published
1943; reprinted in The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology,
ed. Isaac Deutscher (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), 181.
6. David Lethbridge, “The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Fascism,”
The Bethune Institute for Anti-Fascist Studies, 1999, http://bethuneinstitute.org/documents/mltheory.html.
7. T.W. Mason, “The Primacy of Politics – Politics and Economics
in National Socialist Germany,” in The Nature of Fascism: Proceedings
of a conference held by the Reading University Graduate School of Contemporary
European Studies (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), 165-95.
8. Ibid., 179.
9. Ibid., 191f.
10. Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives
of Interpretation, 2nd ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), 44-60;
Jane Caplan, “Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian,”
in Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1945,
ed. Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Walliman (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1989), 149n29.
11. Franklin Hugh Adler, Italian Industrialists from Liberalism to
Fascism: The political development of the industrial bourgeoisie, 1906-1934
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 347.
12. August Thalheimer, “On Fascism,” 1928; reprinted in Marxists
in the Face of Fascism: Writings by Marxists on Fascism from the Interwar
Period, ed. David Beetham (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1984),
188.
13. Ibid., 191.
14. Thalheimer, “So-called Social-fascism,” 1929; reprinted
in Marxists in the Face of Fascism, ed. Beetham, 196.
15. Thalheimer, "On Fascism," 191, 194.
16. Ibid., 190, 192f.
17. Caplan, “Theories of Fascism” (note 10), 143f.
18. Mihaly Vajda, Fascism as a Mass Movement (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1976), 13, 93.
19. Ibid., 93, 75, 8, 105.
20. Ibid., 17, 24, 19f.
21. Ibid., 24f.
22. Xtn, “Introduction,” in Confronting Fascism: Discussion
Documents for a Militant Movement (Montreal, Quebec: Kersplebedeb;
Chicago: Chicago Anti-Racist Action and Arsenal Magazine, 2002), 1-13.
23. J. Sakai, “The Shock of Recognition” in Confronting
Fascism, 88f, 95.
24. Don Hamerquist, “Fascism & Anti-Fascism,” in Confronting
Fascism, 16.
25. Hamerquist, “Fascism & Anti-Fascism,” 38; Sakai, “Shock
of Recognition,” 104.
26. Sakai, “Shock of Recognition,” 94, 89, 93f.
27. Ibid., 91, 121.
28. Hamerquist, “Fascism & Anti-Fascism,” 27.
29. Ibid., 24.
30. Sakai, “Shock of Recognition,” 94.
31. David D. Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Geoff Eley, “What
Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crisis of the Capitalist
State?” in Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany,
ed. Dobkowski and Walliman, 78f.
32. Eley, “What Produces Fascism,” 85.
33. Eley, “What Produces Fascism,” 83; Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers:
A Social, Economic and Ideological Analysis, 1929-1935 (Boston: George
Allen & Unwin, 1983).
34. Hamerquist, “Fascism & Anti-Fascism,” 41.
35. Xtn, “Introduction,” 11-13; Matthew Lyons, “Notes
on Women and Right-Wing Movements.” Three Way Fight blog,
September 2005; revised text, www.scils.rutgers.edu/~lyonsm/WomenAndRight.html.
36. Roger Griffin, “Section II: The Search for the Fascist Minimum:
Presentation,” in International Fascism (note 4), 52f.
37. Griffin, “Notes towards the definition of fascist culture: the
prospects of synergy between Marxist and liberal heuristics,” Renaissance
and Modern Studies 42 (Autumn 2001): 12.
38. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Pinter Publishers,
1991; New York: Routledge, 1996), 11; Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy
of Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 21.
39. Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 32-39.
40. Ibid., 37.
41. Ibid., 38.
42. Griffin, “Notes towards the definition of fascist culture,”
12, 13.
43. Griffin, “Revolution from the Right: Fascism,” in Revolutions
and Revolutionary Tradition in the West 1560-1989, ed. David Parker
(New York: Routledge, 1999).
44. Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 48.
45. Ibid., 47.
46. Griffin, “The ‘Post-Fascism’ of the Alleanza nazionale:
A case-study in Ideological Morphology,” Journal of Political
Ideologies 1, no. 2 (1996): 123-146.
47. Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 121.
48. Ibid., 123.
49. Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 166-74; Griffin, “Europe
for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of the European New Order 1922-1992,”
Humanities Research Centre Occasional Paper, no. 1, 1994.
50. Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 208-11.
51. Ibid., 220.
52. See Griffin's essays entitled “Fascism” written for Encyclopedia
of Fundamentalism, ed. Brenda Brasher (Massachusetts: Berkshire Reference
Works, 2001); The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. Bron
Taylor and Jeffrey Kaplan (Continuum International Publishers, 2003);
and The Encyclopedia of Religion and Politics, draft 11 February
2000.
53. George Mosse, quoted in Griffin, “Notes towards the definition
of fascist culture.”
54. Griffin, “Fascism,” Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism.
55. Ibid.
56. Nikki Keddie, “The New Religious Politics and Women Worldwide:
A Comparative Study,” Journal of Women's History 10, no.
4 (Winter 1999): 11-34,
http://iupjournals.org/jwh/jwh10-4.html.
57. “Nation State – Out of Date?” Third Way,
no. 8 (25 July 1991), 3.
58. Griffin, “Introduction,” in International Fascism,
4.
59. Griffin, “Notes towards the definition of fascist culture.”
60. Dave Renton, Fascism: Theory and Practice (London: Pluto
Press, 1999), 24; Mark Neocleous, Fascism, Concepts in Social Thought
Series (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 38.
61. In a previous draft of this essay, I offered a version of this definition
that had a different final clause, stating that fascism “challenges
capitalist control of the state while defending class exploitation.”
Thanks to Don Hamerquist for pointing out that this violated methodological
empathy, since many neofascists either ignore or disavow class exploitation,
although they glorify hierarchy, authority, and discipline.
62. Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America
(New York: Guilford, 2000); Margaret Canovan, Populism (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981).
63. The following sketches of the Patriot movement and the Christian right
are based on Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America,
chapters 11, 12, and 14.
64. See Martin A. Lee, The Beast Reawakens (Boston: Little Brown
& Co., 1997); Jérôme Jamin, “The Extreme Right
in Europe: Fascist or Mainstream?” The Public Eye 19, no.
1 (Spring 2005), www.publiceye.org/magazine/v19n1/jamin_extreme.html;
Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michalina Vaughan, eds., Neo-Fascism
in Europe (New York: Longman Publishing, 1991).
65. See Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from
Middle East Report (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997);
Said Amir Arjomand, “Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective,”
World Politics 38, no. 3 (April 1986): 383-414; Abdel Azim Ramadan,
“Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in Fundamentalisms and the
State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, ed. Martin E.
Marty and R. Scott Appleby, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume
3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 152-83; Ahmed Rashid,
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001); Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah:
Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Nikki R. Keddie
and Farah Monian, “Militancy and Religion in Contemporary Iran,”
in Fundamentalisms and the State, ed. Marty and Appleby, 511-38.
66. See Matthew Lyons, “Defending my enemy’s enemy,”
Three Way Fight blog, 3 August 2006, http://threewayfight.blogspot.com/2006/08/defending-my-enemys-enemy.html;
and Lyons, “Further thoughts on Hezbollah,” Three Way
Fight, 26 August 2006, http://threewayfight.blogspot.com/2006/08/further-thoughts-on-hezbollah.html.
67. See Arun R. Swamy, “Hindu Nationalism – What's Religion
Got to Do With It?,” Occasional Papers Series, Asian-Pacific
Center for Security Studies, 2003); Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu
Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s (New
Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1999); Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron
Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1999); Vijay Prashad, Namaste Sharon: Hindutva
and Sharonism Under US Hegemony, Signpost Series (New Delhi: LeftWord
Books, 2003).
68. Martin A. Lee, “The Fascist Response to Globalization,”
Los Angeles Times, 28 November 1999. For a parallel argument,
see Roberto Lovato, “Far From Fringe: Minutemen Mobilizes Whites
Left Behind by Globalization,” The Public Eye 19, no. 3
(Winter 2005), www.publiceye.org/magazine/v19n3/lovato_fringe.html.
69. “PART's Perspective on the Militias,” Turning The
Tide 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995).
70. Radhika Desai, “Forward March of Hindutva Halted?” New
Left Review 30 (November-December 2004): 61. On Hindu nationalist
ambivalence about globalization, see Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist
Movement, 432, 492f; Hansen, Saffron Wave, 171f.
71. Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women
in the International Division of Labour (London: Zed, 1986), 118.
Regina Cochrane has criticized Mies for “populist and maternal feminist
tendencies” that are anti-modernist, essentialize motherhood, and
romanticize poverty. However, I believe that Mies’s point about
homemaking that I cite here remains valid and reflects a useful critique
of capitalist globalization's gender dynamics. (See Cochrane, “‘They
Aren't Really Poor’: Ecofeminism, Global Justice, and ‘Culturally-Perceived
Poverty,’” Center for Global Justice, 2006, www.globaljusticecenter.org/papers2006/cochraneENG.htm.)
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