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An
African Cultural Modernity: Achebe, Fanon, Cabral, and the Philosophy
of Decolonization
By
Biodun Jeyifo
Some
Recurrent Themes on the Challenges of an African Cultural Modernity
I start with the contention that if we are to derive much-needed illumination
from the literature and critical thought of Africa of the last half a
century with regard to the profound crises engendered by arrested decolonization
in the postindependence period, three recurrent, closely related themes
on the problem of modernization and modernity in the continent ought to
engage our serious attention. I wish to frame my reflections here around
a synoptic review of these three themes.
The first theme involves a deep sense of perplexity with regard to all
available cognitive or explanatory models and paradigms, precolonial,
colonial and postcolonial. Indeed, this perplexity is so deep, so profound
that it amounts to nothing less than an epistemic impasse. Sometimes,
this theme is rendered in literary criticism of the conventional kind
in the simplistic and distortive framework of a culture clash between
Africa and the West, tradition and modernity, the old and the new, the
indigenous and the alien. Soyinka, among others, has confronted this critical
reductionism with one of its most devastating rebuttals.1 A
much more resonant articulation of this theme of epistemic impasse
is suggested by both the title and the narrative of Achebe's classic novel,
Things Fall Apart, especially in its exploration in depth of
the forcible transition of Umuofia, standing metonymically for all of
precolonial Africa, into a historical space which seems to make invalid
all pre-existing cognitive systems, all paradigms for making confounding
or traumatic experiences comprehensible or negotiable.
This theme is often apprehended in the larger imaginative topography of
anomie, spiritual or psychological. However, what I am emphasizing here
are the specifically epistemic dimensions of the theme. Thus
the narration of the collapse of all the identity-forming and socially
cementing institutions of Umuofia in Things Fall Apart is underscored
by the simultaneous telescoping and fragmenting of vast temporalities
and synchronicities of precolonial experience. It is this particular form
of the disintegration of the institutional matrices which organise and
shape cognition which is conveyed by the Yeatsian/Achebean image of the
center which can no longer hold. In other words, beside the collapse of
ordered practices and values of kinship, identity and community, it is
the terror of losing one's cognitive moorings and having little to shape
the fashioning of new and viable markers or paradigms to make experience
meaningful that leads to the deep historical melancholia at the end of
the novel.
Of the many texts in the corpus of modern African writing which have given
a compelling, mature exploration of this theme of epistemic impasse or
terminus, we may point to the exemplary cases of Soyinka's A Dance
of the Forests, Armah's The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born and
Fragments, Cheikh Hamidou Kane's Ambiguous Adventure, Bessie
Head's A Question of Power, and Dambudzo Marechera's House
of Hunger and Black Sunlight. In these texts we encounter
protagonists, characters and imaginative lifeworlds in which “old,”
hitherto stable meanings, codes, inscriptions and significations no longer
suffice to make experience easily or reassuringly cognizable, at the same
time that “new” syntheses can only very dimly be perceived
if at all.
It is important, I believe, to draw attention to one often ignored but
crucial aspect of this theme of epistemic, cognitive crisis and its corresponding
historical melancholia: its initial articulation literally preceded the
attainment of formal independence, indeed coincided with the inception
of the movement toward decolonization. Moreover, in many notable cases,
the imaginative landscape of the literary expression of this theme involves
a retrospective projection into both pre-colonial, pre-capitalist African
social formations and the forcibly imposed disarticulations of colonial
capitalism. I believe it is important to recall this point if only to
underscore the fact that this theme of epistemic impasse did not emerge,
as many critics seem to think, with “postcolonial disillusionment.”2
The second theme -– which I designate radical alterity and hegemony
-– is perhaps more overtly political; it entails two distinct but
closely interlocking ideas. On one side is the idea that in the modern
world and more specifically the global order of late capitalism, very
powerful, almost insuperable external forces and interests are ranged
against Africa and African peoples and societies; on the other side is
the idea that these mostly Western foreign interests and forces are so
alien to our cultures and societies as to constitute, compositely, a difference
that is radically incommensurable to Africa. It is on the basis
of the convergence of these two ideas that we should look for a deeper
resonance of this theme of radical alterity and hegemony beyond its normative
inscription in our critical discourse as economic and political imperialism
against Africa. In the deeper articulations of this theme in African literature
and critical discourse, the putative difference between the cultural and
civilizational ensembles of Africa and the West are reified in the form
of difference made so incommensurable as to be endlessly inimical and
threatening.
Among the literary works which have explored this theme at some length
and with imaginative force are Achebe's Arrow of God, Soyinka's
Death and the King's Horseman, Ayi Kwei Armah's Two Thousand
Seasons, and Yambo Ouloguem's Bound to Violence. It might
be useful to remark here that Negritude was, in its classical phase, indeed
initially an ideological, perhaps doctrinal codification of this theme
of the radically incommensurable alterity of the West to Africa.3
Furthermore, most of the varieties of the vigorously revisionary “nativism”
of recent critical discourse, as in the notable cases of Chinweizu and
Armah, correspond to a sort of post-Negritude consolidation of this theme.4
I would thus argue that this theme, conceived as a set of dispersed tropes
or “idiologemes” in contemporary African critical discourse,
occupies a deep structure of the political unconscious of the modern African
nationalist or Pan-Africanist literary-cultural imagination.5
The third theme of our review of contemporary African thought derives
dialectically from the second and is indeed a refinement or sublation
of it.6 This theme I identify as that of culturalism.
It essentially entails the view that given the vastly unequal technological,
military and economic dimensions of the encounter of colonized Africa
with the colonizing West -– indeed on account of this very factor
of a massively disproportionate distribution of power and advantage –-
“culture” constitutes the only real bulwark, the last redoubt,
the kernel of both effective resistance to the West and neutralization
of Africa's enormous disadvantage. In all the varied formulations of this
view, “culture” is recognized as being the target of a massive
Western onslaught; however, “culture” is at the same time
seen not only as the most resistant “front” but as the very
ground of resistance on all other “fronts,” economic, political,
military, ideological. Thus, if this theme, as we have noted, is a dialectical
response to the reification of the presumed incommensurable and inimical
alterity of the West to Africa, it is a response by way of a counter-reification:
African “culture” is saved by the very fact of its presumed
absolute difference from the West. In varying formalistic and thematic
expressions, with their divergent ideological inflections, this idea animates
such diverse literary texts as Kobina Sekyi's The Blinkards,
Hampate Ba's The Fortunes of Wangrin, Ebrahim Hussein's Kinjeketile,
Okot p'Bitek's Song of Lawino, Armah's The Healers and,
again, Soyinka's Death and the King's Horseman.
A Changed Historical Ground
It is important to recall these central themes of the literary-critical
discourse on cultural modernity and African societies because, since the
1980s at least, a changed historical ground has given them a new pertinence,
a fresh lease of discursive life. In other words, these themes are being
discursively reinscribed, albeit in greatly altered forms. We shall engage
some of these at the end of this essay, but first, a word on the changed
historical ground. Since the terms which define this have been extensively
delineated and analysed, only its barest outline will be given here, not
in any particular order, but as a composite profile.7
Perhaps the most important feature of this altered historical terrain
is the polarization of the global economic order into two warring camps
of “creditor nations” and “debtor nations.” Expressed
differently, the old polarization between colonizers and colonized, between
empire and colony, has been transmuted into the far more rarified and
finessed antagonism between, as some now put it, nations that “restructure”
and those that “adjust.” Africa is solidly and almostly completely
mired among the most desperately indebted; other things follow, and ramify
from this central factor:
-- Effective control and initiative for the present and future direction
of the continent now lie with the creditor nations, acting through institutional
proxies like the IMF and the World Bank. This spells virtual recolonization
of the continent;
-- As most of the African states enter a kind of collective debt peonage
in which a laissez-faire market economy is imposed on them, there is a
much-touted view that both socialism and capitalism, as paradigms of mobilization
for economic and social progress, have failed in the continent;
-- Given these factors which have reduced Africa's growth rate to virtual
nullity, or even stagnation and real decline, Africa is effectively excluded
from the current explosion of knowledge by the technologization and computerization
of information data and new knowledges and techniques;
-- Given the massive reduction of social expenditure on the public sectors
of the African economies, there is now a virtual collapse of higher education
and high-level manpower training, with a corresponding demoralization
of educational personnel and other professional groups;
-- With the enormous shrinkage of credit and investment capital which
accompany these interlocking developments, there is a monumental reduction
of the cost of reproduction of labor power and general productive capacities;
consequently there is every possibility that competencies and capacities
of the present generation, already almost fatally depressed, will further
deteriorate in the next generation;
-- The greatest human cost is imposed: the immiseration and pauperization
of virtually all urban and rural producers and toilers, especially women
and children;
-- There occurs a perceivable weakening, or even implosion, of the postcolonial
state, given the disappearance of the extractable surplus on which its
apparatus, as well as its legitimacy, rests; consequently, there seems
to be an intensification of more primordial bases of community, allegiance
and sociality.
Given the fact that these patterns and developments are to be found in
virtually all the African states, with perhaps only South Africa as a
historic exception, the total import lies not in particular, differentiated
expressions in each African country, but rather in the way in which these
developments combine to homogenize, objectify and reify the continent,
the “race,” as a weak, stagnating, dependent and tragic zone
of humanity. Given this factor, racial or continental awareness becomes
a sort of community of consciousness of unassuageable suffering
desperately in search of, in Walter Benjamin's famous construct, messianic
time.8
This condition is a fertile ground for a special kind of reification,
a special kind of hypostasis which generates and naturalizes “racial
explanations” in place of scrupulous attention to the historically
contingent crystallization and intensification of unequal relationships
between and within nations and peoples. In its most extreme negative expression,
this reification of “race” as the ground of all explanatory
or analytical paradigms indeed engenders what I would describe as the
mythicization and annulment of history. Thus again today we confront the
increasing racialization of thought and culture about which Fanon
had given insightful warnings. In the cloudy light of this re-racialization
of thought, historical experience and social phenomena assume the extremely
mystifying appearance of new phantasms of the “white man”
or the “Black race.”9
In such conditions, a truly radical African critical discourse calls for
intellectual vigilance, for sustained, unyielding and rigorous acts of
theoretical demythologization. Our reflections on Achebe, Fanon and Cabral
and the philosophy of decolonization thus hope to establish a line of
departure from the tendency toward the reification and obfuscation which
the current historical melancholia all too easily engenders. What links
these three writers indeed is their efforts to demystify reification,
not by ignoring it, but by engaging it directly in both lucid and complex
ways. In this regard, it becomes important to uncover how, on the one
hand, each of the writers engages our three central themes and, on the
other, how we might read each of these engagements –- Achebe's,
Fanon's and Cabral's -– against one another, and against the more
generalized philosophy of decolonization which we deem a fundamental aspect
of contemporary intellectual culture.
Achebe: Telos, Progressivism and De-mythologization
To read Achebe’s ideas on the genealogy and evolution of an African
cultural modernity, on the one hand, in his imaginative works and, on
the other, in his non-fictional essays, is to become acutely conscious
of the need for very discriminating, hermeneutically flexible and open
reading strategies. For scattered throughout Achebe's fictional and non-fictional
prose works are ideas which, at one level might seem inconsistent and
contradictory, but at another level reveal deep structural, dialectical
regularities and unities (if it is remembered that the “unity”
of the dialectic not only admits, but consists of contradiction and tension).10
This calls for careful elaboration.
Even a cursory reading of many of Achebe's fictional and non-fictional
prose works shows immediately that the themes of a radical incommensurability
of “Africa” and “Europe” and of the great disproportion
in power and historic advantage between them, are explored extensively
by him, and in quite unique representational terms. Consider the sort
of inscription of these themes that we find in Achebe’s novelistic
masterpiece, Arrow of God,11 in the account given
by Winterbottom (the colonial District Officer) of a particular episode
in the military “pacification” of Umuaro:
I think I can say with all modesty that this change came after I had
gathered and publicly destroyed all firearms, except of course, this collection
here. You will be going there frequently on tour. If you hear anyone talking
about Otiji-Egbe, you know that they are talking about me. Otiji-Egbe
means “Breaker of Guns.” I am even told that all children
born in that year belong to a new age-grade of the Breaking of the Guns.
[36-7]
The triumphalism of this account, which savours and re-enacts the psychic
violence it narrates, is all the more interesting in that it seems to
find complicity in the way in which the colonized have ritualized and
encoded the event in collective memory. Clearly, Winterbottom intends
a ritualization of the colonizer's military superiority or invincibility
in the ceremonial, pubic enactment of the event. As some scholars have
noted, this reveals the European colonizers' consumate love of spectacle
-– of ceremonial display of power and majesty –- that played
a crucial role in the consolidation and stabilization of colonial rule
in Africa and Asia.12 Thus, if this is a recognizable part
of the culture of colonialism, what is extraordinary in Achebe's depiction
is the seeming complicity, even acquiescence, of the colonized in the
ritualization of the colonizer's military superiority. This seems to be
even more pointed in the following account of Ezeulu's ruminations on
“book” and writing as indices of a vast chasm in
cultural achievement and advantage between the “white man”
and the “black man”:
The messenger pointed in his direction and the other man followed
with his eye and saw Ezeulu. But he only nodded and continued to write
in his big book. When he finished what he was writing he opened a connecting
door and disappeared into another room. He did not stay long there; when
he came out again be beckoned at Ezeulu, and showed him into the white
man's presence. He too was writing, but with his left hand. The first
thought that came to Ezeulu on seeing him was to wonder whether any black
man ould ever achieve the same mastery over book as to write it with the
left hand. [173]
Since this is Ezeulu the proud priest who refuses to be the “white
man's warrant chief,” it behoves us not to read this pasage in isolation
from other kinds, or orders, of narrative and representation
in the novel. For Ezeulu is not like the benighted fireman on the riverboat
in Conrad's Heart of Darkness who, thanks to Conrad's totalizing
and totalitarian exclusion of “native” versions of “reality”
other than his own narcissitically “European” point of view,13
cannot have any conception of the riverboat’s engine-room boiler
or furnace other than as a malevolent, fiery spirit who must be constantly
and endlessly appeased. Thus, even though Ezeulu, from the conditioned
gaze of an analphabetic, non-literate culture, mystifies “book”
and writing, in many other respects, especially on the level of ethical
and spiritual reflectiveness and acceptance of moral responsibilitity,
Ezeulu considers himself, and aspects of his culture, superior to the
culture and values of the “white man.” This is definitely
the spirit of his testimony against his own community of Umuaro in the
“white man's” court in which he makes a deposition against
what he sees as a “war of blame” by his own people against
Okperi, a neighboring community. In making that deposition, Ezeulu stands
completely alone, distanced as much from the land-grabbing, aggressive
opportunism of his own community as from the manipulative, divide-and-dominate
politicking of the white colonial administration. But significantly, Ezeulu
invokes ethical imperatives from his culture in maintaining his lonely
unpopular stand.
This line of interpretation allows us to see that the structure of Achebe's
representations and narratives on the historic encounter of Europe and
Africa is intricately dialectical and is shaped by ambiguity and irony.
At the very least, I identify three levels of narratological, representational
or ideological matrices, all deeply interconnected. Here, I will attempt
only a brief unravelling of these matrices.
At one level, the superb realist logic of Achebe's narrative art shows
a deep intuitive grasp of objective, impersonal mediations and determinations
on the encounter of the colonizer and the colonized. Moreover, this is
matched by a rigorous fidelity to the exploration of these processes and
determinations in their own right and at that level at which they are
not only ultimately beyond the control of either side, but cannot even
be adequately perceived, let alone understood and mastered. The most widely
discussed of these is the case of Oduche, Ezeulu's son who, at his father's
behest, goes to the “white man's” church and school in order
to be his father's “eyes and ears”; however, Oduche disappoints
his father and culture by the way that his formation as a newly colonized
subject, an unintended “évolué,” exceeds his
father's plans. This is the level of the external, objective operation
of the dialectic of history and subjectivity, and Achebe’s realist
art is superbly attentive to it.
At another level, that of interiority and personal volition, Achebe does
not cede individuals, their passions, anxieties, eccentricities, strengths
and weaknesses to total control and determination by abstract, impersonal
forces and processes. This is perhaps a product both of his version of
realism and his deep strain of humanist sympathies. Thus, it should be
remarked that Achebe extends his understanding, and his solicitude and
compassion, to both the colonizer and the colonized, both the victims
and the perpetrators of reification. One instantiation of this is the
total portrait of Winterbottom, “the Breaker of Guns”: even
at the very moment of glorying in his triumph as “Otiji-Ogbe,”
Breaker of Guns, the vulnerable, wasting man behind the mythic lionization
is deftly shown to be succumbing to that classic of the wages or nemesis
of colonial “sin” -– tropical fever -– and the
relentless human vitiation lodged within the natural cycle of aging.
The most intricate, daunting level of these matrices of Achebe's representations
of historical experience concerns his infusion into his characteristic
realist detachment and irony passionate espousals of particular causes
and somewhat more limited communal, national and even “racial”
interests. Some of these are: the human worth and fundamental dignity
of the African precolonial past, with all its imperfections and limitations;14
the cause of women and all marginalized groups and classes;15
the vocation of writing in particular and art in general in an increasingly
philistine, vulgarly materialistic African postcoloniality;16
the cause of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war and of the Igbo people
in the skewed, explosively antagonistic “peace” of post-civil
war Nigeria;17 and the Pan-Africanist internationalism of an
African humanity which embraces the continent and the diaspora.18
This is perhaps the greatest challenge to interpretation posed by Achebe's
fictional and non-fictional works: the intersection and convergence in
these works of realist detachment and objectivity, intuitive grasp of
the inner movement of complex mediations and determinations, a broad,
catholic humanist sympathy, and the espousal of particularist causes.
It is against this complex tapestry of Achebe's narrative art, broad moral
and philosophical temper, and passionate political and ideological enthusiams
that one must, I believe, read what comes across in his writings as the
most recurrent, the most insistent, and the most problematic theme on
modernity and modernization: a much too linear and teleological view of
historical change, a much too schematic division between “backwardness”
and “progressiveness,” between cultural immobilism and dynamism.
I would like to examine this issue briefly by juxtaposing three passages
from different fictional and non-fictional works of the Nigerian author.
The first passage, the earliest of our three examples, comes from some
fragmentary, non-fictional notes titled “Tourist Sketches”
published in 1962 which bore the subtitle “being part of an unwritten
travel book”:
The Wachagga who inhabit the slopes of Kilimanjaro are today a very progressive
people. They are comparatively wealthy because they grow coffee on the
most modern cooperative lines. I am told that the Wachagga used not to
be very popular with the British administration, especially with one particular
Governor who did not fancy natives in lounge suits.
The Masai their neighbours took one look at western civilization and turned
their back on it; the Wachagga plunged in without taking a look. They
are always trying out new things. In the fifties they decided to unite
their 300,000 people under a paramount chief, and chose as their first
ruler Tom Marealle who was educated at the London School of Economics.
In 1960 they found him too ambitious and replaced him with an elected
President, Solomon Eliufo who had been educated at Makerere and the United
States and was one of Mr. Nyerere's brightest ministers...
Personally I think New Africa belongs to those who, like the Wachagga,
are ready to take in new ideas. Like all those with open minds they will
take in a lot of rubbish. They will certainly not be a tourist attraction.
But in the end life will favour those who come to terms with it and not
those who run away.19
Our second passage takes us back to Arrow of God in Winterbottom's
speech on the “breaking of guns.” The echoes of the earlier
text on “Massais” and “Wachaggas” are unmistakable:
Those guns have a long and interesting history. The people of Okperi
and their neighbours Umuaro are great enemies. Or they were before I came
into the story. A big savage war had broken out between them over a piece
of land. This feud was made worse by the fact that Okperi welcomed missionaries
and government while Umuaro, on the other hand, has remained backward.
It was only in the last four or five years that any kind of impression
has been made there. [36]
Finally, a passage from Achebe's book of trenchant social criticism, The
Trouble with Nigeria, published in 1983. The quote is from an essay
titled “The Igbo Problem":
The origin of the national resentment of the Igbo is as old as Nigeria
and quite as complicated. But it can be summarized thus: The Igbo culture
being receptive to change, individualistic and highly competitive, gave
the Igbo man an unquestioned advantage over his compatriots in securing
credentials for advancement in Nigerian colonial society. Unlike the Hausa/Fulani
he was unhindered by a wary religion and unlike the Yoruba unhampered
by traditional hierarchies. This kind of creature, fearing nor God nor
man, was custom-made to grasp the opportunities, such as they were, of
the white man's dispensation. And the Igbo did so with both hands. Although
the Yoruba had a huge historical and geographical head-start the Igbo
wiped out their handicap in one fantastic burst of energy in the twenty
years between 1930 and 1950.20
The implicit teleological, progressivist, quasi-Darwinian view in these
quotes on the topic of modernization and modernity is, as is now very
well known, a major aspect of the hegemonist ideology of empire-building
Europe in its global reach over the course of four hundred years.21
It achieves one of its most “scientific” expressions in W.W.
Rostow's famous key text of 1960s bourgeois sociology of development,
Stages of Economic Growth.22 And as Byran Turner has
demonstrated in his important book, Marx and the End of Orientalism,
when applied to the so-called developing world, this teleological, progressivist
view of modernity fastens almost exclusively on “internalist”
or “culturalist” obstacles to modernization and development.23
Thus this teleological progressivism marks a point of theoretical and
ideological weakness in Achebe's ideas on culture and development, even
though, as we have seen, his works constitute a powerful critique of reification
and abstraction of “culture” from historical processes and
the competitive struggles between social groups, nations, peoples. Alongside
Achebe’s teleological formulations, there has thus always been something
of an internal critique of them in his writings, and some of his recent
essays and fictional works have indeed deepened and expanded on the more
muted articulation of this critique in his earlier writings.24
This is particularly true of the novel Anthills of the Savannah25
and the collection of essays, Hopes and Impediments. In these
works we encounter a much more complex view of “culture” as
the kernel of resistance to both local and foreign domination and as a
germ of renewal and transformation. In other words, we find a transcendence
of the schematic, binary division of history and experience in the teleological,
progressivist formulation of a radical separation and antagonism between
“stronger” and “weaker” peoples and social groups,
more “dynamic” and “static” cultures, the precolonial,
precapitalist past and the varied capitalisms of the present. In Anthills
of the Savannah, this exemplary transcendence of cultural or experiential
binarisms is symbolized by the novel's extraordinary closing narrative
and representational tropes: Elewa's new baby girl is given a boy's name
and during this emblematic enactment the men, as traditional embodiments
of “strength,” initiative and decisiveness, are noticeably
in the background. And consider the radical critique of, even the break
with, teleological thought in the following passage from the eloquent
essay on culture and development, “What Has Literature Got to Do
with It”:
In
one sense [there is] a travelling away from [an] old self towards a cosmopolitan,
modern identity, while in another sense [there is a] journeying back to
regain a threatened past and selfhood. To comprehend the dimensions of
this gigantic paradox and coax from it such unparalleled inventiveness
requires not mere technical flair but the archaic energy, the perspective,
the temperament of creation myths and symbolism. It is in the very nature
of creativity, in its prodigious complexity and richness, that it will
accommodate paradoxes and ambiguities. But this, it seems, will always
elude and pose a problem for the uncreative, literal mind. The literal
mind is the one-track mind, the simplistic mind, the mind that cannot
comprehend that where one thing stands, another will stand beside it –-
the mind (finally and alas!) which appears to dominate our current thinking
on Nigeria's need for technology.26
Fanon
and Cabral: Materialist Hermeneutics and Cultural Theory
In approaching the immensely crucial works of Fanon and Cabral, it is
perhaps useful to recall the extraordinary idea that we extrapolated above
from Achebe's essay, “What Has Literature Got to Do With It?”
which states that the problematic of modernization and modernity for non-Western
societies involves a janus-faced embrace of the past and the future: a
moving outward and forward toward technological mastery and cosmopolitan
identity as well as a moving inward and backward in time to repossess
an archaic cultural energy and creativity lodged in residual sediments
derived from the preindustrial, precapitalist and precolonial cultures.
This notion flies in the face of the dominant discourses on development
and modernity in African and Third World societies, which are all mostly
based on teleologically progressivist and evolutionist theories. Sometimes,
as in the case of a W.W. Rostow, these theories are quite explicit in
affirming that there are definite, sequential stages to necessarily and
progressively pass through in the forward march to modernization, affirming
in effect that one cannot skip intermediate stages with impunity in order
to arrive at real modernity. Mostly, however, these theoretical suppositions
on stagist evolutionism are muted, implicit; nonetheless they run deep.
Most theorists and popularizing pundits of this school, Africans and non-Africans
alike, locate Africa at the earlier phases of this teleological-evolutionist
schema, thereby implying that the problems and challenges of modernization
and modernity in Africa are almost insuperable on account of the presumed
cultural provenance of backwardness. If Achebe's formulation
of the engine of modernity facing forward and looking back at the same
time is a powerful metaphoric rebuttal of this telos, the writings
of Fanon and Cabral constitute important theoretical validation
of this rebuttal.
Since most of Fanon's mature writings on cultural theory are in his last
three books, The Wretched of the Earth, A Dying Colonialism
and Toward The African Revolution, it may be useful to raise
the question of how his first book, Black Skins, White Masks, a more youthful,
passionate, tortured self-analysis, relates to the later works. The title
is pertinent here: masks and phantoms of a black subjectivity overdetermined
by deep complexes of alienation and self-hatred. In other words, the book
was a courageous, unflinching, brilliant look at the sources
which generate, and the forms/shades which express the “black man”
as the absolute Other, the incarnation of negativity and inferiority.
Beyond this, the book also explored how this phantasm became internalized,
lived and acted out in elaborate forms of schizophrenia (e.g. linguistic
and psychosexual) and how it could and should be terminated. What Fanon
was thus later able to do in his mature works came by way of deepening
and generalizing these insights of Black Skins, White Masks to
wider historical, political and ideological contexts implied, for instance,
in the title The Wretched of the Earth.
Indeed one can, I believe, plot a sort of movement in Fanon's thought
in general, and on cultural theory in particular, in the ideas and achievements
of these four titles: from the most concrete, personal and confessional
descent into subjetivity in Black Skins, White Masks, through
a more muted form of the searing, poetic prose of the earlier book as
he articulates a sort of manifesto and primer of revolt (in the context
of historic decolonization) in A Dying Colonialism and The
Wretched of the Earth, to the essays of Toward the African Revolution
which, in a visionary, proleptic register, look ahead beyond formal decolonization
to the consolidation of the momentum of emancipation. Thus in Fanon's
work we find an internal dynamic which is rare not only in intellectual
history in general but also among revolutionary intellectuals: a trajectory
which progresses from the most intimate, personal, concrete and particular
expression of suffering and thwarted desire, to its generalization and
universalisation to encompass the truths of collective class, national
and racial oppressions of the most marginalized of a world order under
colonial and imperial domination. This is perhaps what has, in the decades
since his death, turned Fanon into the leading theorist of national liberation
as vehicle of revolutionary transcendence of many forms of oppression
in the developing world: psycho-social and psyco-sexual alienation; economic
and political domination and marginalization; the usurpation of the right
to self-representation.
From the perspective of our own present reflections, perhaps the most
important lesson of Fanon's life and work is that, starting from the most
personal experience of racial negation, he made so thorough a
theoretical investigation of it as to link it with virtually
every other form and site of negation and oppression. And he turned his
searing demystification both on the oppressor and the oppressed, both
on arrogant, triumphalist Europe in its imperial project and on Africa
beaten down, exploited, inferiorized, condemned to backwardness. By totally
absorbing the insights of the major Western intellectual currents of his
day -– structuralism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, linguistics
and revolutionary socialist theory –- and by engaging thinkers like
Hegel, Marx, Sorrel, Adler and Lacan, he was extraordinarily penetrating
on the contradictions and hypocrisies at the heart of Europe's finest
ideas and institutions -– humanism, democracy, the secular, rationalist
legacy of the Enlightenment. Conversely, while he was deeply sympathetic
to the racialized, nationalist or culturalist turning way from Europe,
he was penetrating in his account of its dangers, pitfalls, delusions
and, ultimately, self-reification. In this particular respect, the penetrating
reach of his critique of Negritude is perhaps still to be matched.
Above all else, Fanon demonstrated that successful, emancipatory resistance
is possible for oppressed “races,” peoples, nations and classes
at whatever level of economic, psychological and historic disadvantage
and devastation by cultural imperialism; but he insisted that this was
possible only on the basis of avoiding the reification both of the “racial”
or “nationalist” self as incarnation of virtue, and of the
colonizing Other as the embodiment of evil. This was the crux of Fanon's
exposé on the dangers of freezing the initial manicheanism of the
culture of colonialism into a permanent binarism; regrettably, this insight
has been widely ignored or misunderstood. Finally, Fanon cautioned the
middle-class African intellectual or writer to be aware of seductions
and inducements to moral vaccilations and ideological compromises which
are inherent in his or her being part of the colonized elite, part of
the pseudo-bourgeoisie whose role, according to Fanon, would in all probability,
be to betray the promise of independence, to arrest or set back the forward
motion of historical decolonization.
With the possible exception of the descent into a personal, intensely
subjective experience of racial alienation and its theoretical generalization
into a collective psychohistory of racial disalienation, most of these
themes of Fanon's mature writings are present in Cabral's work. The important
differences between the two revolutionary thinkers pertain to points of
emphasis and contexts of theoretical reflections. Thus, in general, Cabral's
writings are less personal, less “confessional” than Fanon’s;
they are more grounded in close, extensive and exacting analyses of African
societies and cultures in the context of what was perhaps the best organized,
most ideologically developed anti-colonial, anti-imperialist national
liberation struggle in Africa, namely that of the former Portuguese colonies.
And since Cabral was arguably the greatest theoretician of that extraordinary
anti-colonial, anti-imperialist movement, what we have in his work by
way of the philosophy of decolonization, especially in the domain of cultural
theory, marks perhaps the highest point of theoretical elaboration prior
to the consolidation of recolonization in its present stage.
Given the many points of convergence between Fanon and Cabral, we can
only in the present context indicate, in summary fashion, the main ideas
of Cabral. Three closely connected ideas seem to be of exceptional significance.
First, there is the notion that whatever the level of economic development,
whatever the material conditions of a particular society, it is a bearer
and creator of culture and thus capable of self-regeneration and self-renewal,
capable of mastery of techniques and processes necessary for survival
and social reproduction relative to that society's level of development.
We can see that this point directly addresses the themes of the radical
incommensurability between Africa and the West and the great disproportion
in initiative, power and advantage between them. Secondly, there is Cabral's
thesis that, “without underestimating the importance of positive
contributions from the oppressor's culture and other cultures,”
emancipation, progress, transformation will come to Africa and other Third
World societies only if they return to the upward paths of the liberation
of their productive capacities, distorted or paralysed by colonialism's
devaluation of the culture of the colonized. Without the liberation of
these productive capacities, Cabral insists that no progress is possible.
Finally, there is Cabral's thesis on the multiform, complex, asymetrical
and contradictory nature of culture, especially in Africa with regard
to the historical heterogeneity of its peoples and societies, and their
violent disaggregation by colonial capitalism. Indeed, it is perhaps best
to bring our observations and reflections in this essay to a close by
quoting directly from Cabral on this point:
In the specific conditions of our country –- and we should say
of Africa -– the horizontal and vertical distribution of levels
of culture is somewhat complex. In fact, from the villages to the towns,
from one ethnic group to another, from the peasant to the artisan or to
the more or less assimilated indigenous intellectual, from one social
class to another, and even as we have said from individual to individual
within the same social category, there are significant variations in the
quantitative and qualitative levels of culture.... For culture to play
the important role which falls to it in the framework of development of
the liberation movement, the movement must be able to conserve the positive
cultural values of every well-defined social group, of every category,
and to achieve the confluence of these values into the stream of struggle,
giving them a new dimension -– the national dimension.27
Notes
1. This is contained in Soyinka's prefatory note to his play, Death and
the King's Horseman, London: Methuen, 1975. I should add that in the context
of this essay I will be using the terms “modernization” and
“modernity” interchangeably, even though they mean quite different
things and historical, cultural processes; “modernity,” for
instance, indicates a more complex, contradictory and elusive concept
than “modernization.”
2. See
Timothy Brennan, Salman Rushdie and the Third World, London: Macmillan,
1989.
3. I define as “classical” Negritude most of Senghor's definitions
and elaborations on the subject up to the end of the 1950s. In this phase,
Negritude is defined primarily in its particularity, in its difference
and opposition to Europe. In the 1960s, and after formal independence
and the institutionalization of Negritude as a sort of official ideology
or cultural doctrine, we have what I call a “revisionist”
Negritude which underplays particularism as Senghor increasingly talks
of the contribution of Negritude to the “civilisation of the universal.”
See my “Negritude and Its Discontents,” forthcoming.
4. There are important differences between the “nativisms”
of these two writers. Armah tends to be far more erudite, more philosophically
grounded, while Chinweizu is more the polemicist and gadfly to Eurocentrism.
See Armah, “Masks and Marx: The Marxist Ethos vis-à-vis African
Revolutionary Theory and Praxis,” Présence Africaine, 3rd
Quarter, 1984, and Chinweizu, the introduction titled “Redrawing
the Map of African Literature” to his Voices from 20th Century Africa,
London: Faber & Faber, 1988.
5. See, for the full-scale theoretical exposition of “idiologeme,”
Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic
Act, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.
6. Sublation is the act of canceling but also preserving in an elevated
and transformed manner as a moment in a dialectical process.
7. See, among other numerous titles on this subject, Ben Turok, Africa:
What Can Be Done? London: Zed Press, 1987; Kofi Buenor Hadjor, Africa
in an Era of Crisis, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990; and Samir
Amin, Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World, London: Zed Press, 1985.
8. Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, New York: Schocken
Books, 1968, especially the chapter, “Theses on the Philosophy of
History.”
9. The phrase “racialization of thought” was initially coined
by Frantz Fanon, in the chapter “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness,”
in The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove Press, 1963.
10. On the concept of “contradiction” see, among others, Roy
Bhaskar, Dialectic, Materialism and Human Emancipation, London: New Left
Books, 1983, and Lucio Colletti, “Marxism and the Dialectic,”
New Left Review No. 93, 1975.
11. Chinua Achebe, Arrow of God, New York: Doubleday, 1969. All page references
are to this edition and are indicated in parentheses in the text of the
essay.
12. See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
13. For a brilliant discussion of this point, see Edward Said, “Intellectuals
in the Postcolonial World,” Salmagundi, No. 70-71, Spring-Summer
1986.
14. See Chinua Achebe, “The Novelist as Teacher,” in Morning
Yet on Creation Day, London: Heinemann, 1975.
15. I have explored this theme in Achebe's writings in two different essays:
“For Chinua Achebe: The Resilience and the Predicament of Obierika,”
in Kunapipi, Special Issue in Celebration of Chinua Achebe, Vol. 12, No.
2, 1990, and “Okonkwo and his Mother: Things Fall Apart and Issues
of Gender in the Constitution of African Postcolonial Discourse,”
in Callaloo, A Journal of Afro-American and African Arts and Letters,
Vol. 16, No. 4, 1993.
16. See Chinua Achebe, “The Truth of Fiction” in Hopes and
Impediments: Selected Essays, 1965-1987, London: Heinemann, 1987.
17. See, among other statements and writings of Achebe on this subject,
“The African Writer and the Biafran Cause,” in Morning Yet
on Creation Day (note 14), and “The Igbo Problem,” in The
Trouble with Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1983.
18. On this subject, perhaps the most eloquent illustrations are Achebe's
famous encounters with James Baldwin, and his founding of the journal
African Commentary whose coverage encompassed both the continent and the
African diaspora.
19. Chinua Achebe, “Tourist Sketches,” in Frances Ademola,
ed., Reflections: Nigerian Prose and Verse, Lagos: African Universities
Press, 1962.
20. The Trouble with Nigeria, 46.
21. See Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989.
22. W.W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
23. Bryan S. Turner, Marx and the End of Orientalism, London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1978.
24. I have explored this in an essay, “Things Fall Apart: One Marxist
Exegesis,” in Bernth Lindfors, ed., Approaches to Teaching Things
Fall Apart, MLA [Modern Languages Association], 1991.
25. Chinua Achebe, Anthills of the Savannah, London: Heinemann, 1988.
26. Hopes and Impediments, 110.
27. Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle, London: Heinemann, 1980, 144-5.
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