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Current Issue #52
Vol 24, No. 1
For
texts of articles published within the past year, please contact us
(info@sdonline.org)
about buying a copy of the journal, or else
contact our publishers through their website: www.tandf.co.uk/journals
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Table of Contents
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52
(Volume 24, No. 1)
Cuban
Perspectives on Cuban Socialism
Preface
by
The Editors
Introduction, by Alfredo
Prieto
Rafael Hernández, Revolution/Reform and Other Cuban
Dilemmas
Juan Valdés Paz, Cuba: The Left in Government,
1959-2008
Emilio Duharte Díaz, Cuba at the Onset of the
21st Century: Socialism, Democracy, and Political Reforms
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and Pavel
Vidal Alejandro, Cuba’s Economy: A Current Evaluation
and Several Necessary Proposals
Mayra Espina, Looking at Cuba Today: Four Assumptions
and Six Intertwined Problems
María del Carmen Zabala Argüelles, Poverty
and Vulnerability in Cuba Today
Marta Núñez Sarmiento, Cuban Development
Strategies and Gender Relations
Aurelio Alonso, Religion in Cuba’s Socialist
Transition
Rodrigo Espina Prieto and Pablo Rodríguez
Ruiz, Race and Inequality in Cuba Today
Notes on Contributors

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Introduction
The Cuba Issue Collective
Section
I: Economy and Society
Section
II: Government
Section
III: The Agrarian Sector
(The introductions
listed above preface each section of the issue. You can order a copy of
the Cuba issue and get the full texts of each section by calling (617)
776-9505 or emailing us at info@sdonline.org.
The table of contents of the entire
issue can be viewed in the back issues section.)
============================
Section
III: The Agrarian Sector
Introduction
Cuba's agrarian
reform of 1993-a result of change subsequent to the collapse of the Socialist
Bloc-may turn out to be the most far-reaching since the first agrarian
reform of 1959. The two articles in this section study this process and
show that it is by no means completed. At stake, argues Hans-Jürgen
Burchardt, a researcher from Hannover University in Germany who has done
extensive study in Cuba, is no less than the solution to agrarian problems
inherited from Cuba's old export-based sugar monoculture based on huge
farms or latifundia.
The reforms
involved a switch between 1993 and 1996 in dominant forms of land tenure
and social relations in agriculture. Massive, highly mechanized, high-input
state farms staffed by salaried workers gave way to smaller, labor-intensive,
low input, democratically-run, profit sharing cooperatives. State farms
subdivided a portion of their land. On the resulting parcels, virtual
ownership of crops and control of tools were to go rent-free to newly
formed workers' collectives, formed from the state farm's workers and
others. Some distribution of lands to willing family farmers or parceleros
was also required. Though widespread, the new cooperative form did not
cover all state lands.
All of the
authors represented in this section studied the new conditions first hand.
Burchardt focuses on the reform's economic implications. Niurka Pérez
and Dayma Echevarría look at the effects on workers' lives of the
new system of co-ops or UBPCs (Basic Units of Cooperative Production or
Unidades Básicas de Producción Cooperativa). The UBPCs negotiate
their production plans with their respective state farm enterprises. This
requirement to negotiate production with the state farm enterprises, underemphasized
in the government's initial recruitment campaign, gave rise to divergent
views as the reform advanced. Pérez and Echevarría show
that the UPBCs believed their autonomy would be extensive, while the state
farm enterprises envisioned limited UBPC autonomy. While Burchardt and
Pérez & Echevarría grant that too much UBPC autonomy
might weaken the cooperatives' service to the Cuban people, they warn
that insufficient autonomy will not tap the huge productivity potential
in the new cooperative form.
A look at
earlier agrarian reforms will place our two articles in historical context.
The 1959 reform turned latifundia over to their workforces as cooperatives.
A 1963 law brought two thirds of cultivated land, co-ops included, under
direct state control, creating the state farm system. Rural living standards
and life expectancy improved greatly. But, salaries were unrelated to
yields. And farm workers were often in the odd position of purchasing
their own products. In the belief that "more state property means
more socialism," as Burchardt puts it, this system expanded. But
compared to private farms, productivity of the state farms remained consistently
lower.
To boost
productivity--especially in foodstuffs--the government invited private
farmers in 1977 to form more authentic cooperatives. Joining the Cooperativas
de Producción Agropecuaria (CPAs) was voluntary, but strong incentives
existed: compensation for land pooled, pensions, and access to home construction
materials. CPAs multiplied. Results proved impressive: the CPAs' productivity
outstripped that of state farms, and their share of non-sugar sales to
the state for distribution grew. Food's share of Cuba's total import bill
halved in 1970-80. After peaking in 1983 at 82,000, membership in the
CPAs fell due to declining profitability relative to private farmers who,
in 1980, had been allowed to sell at peasant markets. Shutting these markets
in 1986 restored CPA profitability, but new limits on their autonomy dampened
enthusiasm among the young. By 1991 collectivization using CPAs came to
a standstill.
In 1990,
after crisis hit the Soviet Union, there were major shortfalls in Soviet
grain and oil deliveries. In April 1992 Fidel pointed out that while CPAs
and small farmers produced more per acre than state farms, their deliveries
to the state marketing agency were far lower, implying that they channeled
produce to the black market. By 1993, imports were at half pre-1989 levels.
Shortages of fuels and other inputs helped cut domestic output by some
35%. After a dismal 1992-93 sugar harvest, coupled with low prices, sugar
revenues fell drastically. In March of 1993, the "storm of the century"
did $200 million in damage to the agrarian sector. People did not have
enough to eat.
In this context
the government launched the UBPCs described in the articles below. To
date, the results of this attempt to resolve Cuba's agrarian problems
are mixed at best. While many UBPCs remain "unprofitable" particularly
in sugar (partly due to bad harvests), non-sugar yields have tended to
be somewhat better. Results vary, however, from crop to crop and area
to area. To account for this mixed performance, market advocates blame
disincentives in the state's below-market prices. Others point to a lack
of UBPC workers' autonomy, and both articles find that UBPC workers feel
state controls to be excessive. But the final verdict on this experiment
remains to be given.
To put Cuban
farmers' problems in perspective, we should note that international bankers
have for decades imposed structural adjustment programs that dispossess
Third World farmers by pricing land beyond their reach and cutting their
crops' value. Cuba's small farmers, by contrast, take for granted access
to land, credit, and technical assistance. Indeed, each reform of Cuban
agriculture has brought ever more direct access to these basic resources.
The question is one of balance: how to coordinate the co-ops while respecting
their autonomy. This is the key to consolidating the success of the 1993
reform, a problem which constitutes, according to Burchardt, "the
main challenge facing Cuban society."
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